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1. Introduction
 
In 1992, a group of visionary business leaders came to the White House with a different 
agenda than most industry lobbyists. They wanted to let the President know that a growing 
share of the corporate world was taking environmental problems such as climate change very 
seriously, and that they were ready to work with governments to design appropriate regulatory 
frameworks. President George H.W. Bush was astonished by this message: “Young man,” he 
asked the leader of the newly established Business Council for Sustainable Development 
(BCSD), “why is it that so many industry people come to lobby me with all kinds of requests 
for protection, subsidies or favors…and you’re … taking initiatives [sic] for something that 
the others all seem to try and fend off?” (Timberlake, 2006:18). Indeed, at the time, the 
Council’s approach was unique. Business support and advocacy for regulations to limit 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions was almost unheard of, and in Europe and the U.S., 
dominant industry lobbies were organizing in stark opposition to the establishment of 
mandatory emissions limitations.  
In retrospect, however, the constructive approach of the BCSD marked the beginning 
of a more profound process of strategic change among dominant business lobbies. By the turn 
of the decade, many of the previously antagonistic business lobbies had begun to abandon a 
strategy of opposition, and by 2008, a whole new landscape of more constructive and 
regulation friendly business associations had materialized. Indeed, some of these lobbies had 
also begun to push for the establishment of regulatory frameworks to limit GHG emissions. 
No one existing approach to studying business and environmental governance can 
satisfactorily account for or explain this apparent strategic shift.  
This dissertation unpacks this strategic shift and assesses its impact on political and 
regulatory change. To this end, it develops an integrated conceptual framework centered on 
how the interplay between business-strategy formation and embryonic environmental 
governance can generate dynamics and mechanisms that trigger political momentum and 
regulatory change. The framework is employed to analyze the development of the 
international climate change regime and climate change politics in the United States.  
In short, the framework posits the following: When proposals for new environmental 
regulations first emerge on the policy agenda, liable and affected industries are likely to 
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organize in opposition due to potentially high adjustment and compliance costs. However, 
under certain conditions that may emerge as an issue area of environmental governance 
matures—including the increase of regulatory threats and uncertainties, uneven playing fields 
and new market opportunities—the preferences and strategies of dominant business lobbies 
are likely to shift from opposition towards regulatory entrepreneurship. The model defines 
this threshold, at which a critical mass of business lobbies begins to support or push for the 
adoption of new regulation, as a ‘tipping point’ in business strategies. The framework also 
argues that the materialization of a tipping point may generate more enabling conditions for 
bargaining and, under favorable conditions, generate significant progress in the political 
and/or regulatory process.  Through detailed case studies of business lobbying with respect to 
climate change policy, this dissertation concludes that the tipping point framework provides a 
plausible account of the dynamics of political and regulatory change in both the contexts of 
the United States and the international climate regime.  
While most previous literature has conceptualized strategic, political and regulatory 
change in static terms, this framework elucidates the importance of understanding dynamics. 
Most importantly, the framework (1) reveals how mechanisms for change in environmental 
governance are constructed through complex interplays between the interests of participating 
agents and nascent governance structures, and (2) demonstrates the significance of dynamic 
thresholds such as tipping points in triggering cascades of progress.  
This chapter introduces and discusses this dissertation research as it is presented in 
three scholarly journal articles. The chapter proceeds as follows: First, the research domains 
of business and environmental governance are introduced and terms defined. Second, the 
research agenda and design are explained and justified. Three core research questions are 
formulated, which correspond to the research articles. Third, the methodological approach is 
defined and assessed with respect to the theory and practice of developing conceptual 
knowledge and theory, and to concrete strategies and methods for data-collection, evaluation 
and analysis. The next section reviews existing theoretical approaches relevant to the research 
agenda, first with respect to analyzing business power, strategy formation and environmental 
governance, and second with respect to the politics, dynamics, and conditions of regulatory 
formation. This review critically discusses the merits and limits of these literatures, and 
evaluates their contribution vis-à-vis the tipping point framework. Then follows a summary of 
the three academic journal articles. Principal findings are outlined to render conclusions 
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regarding the contribution and implications of this research to the field. This chapter lastly 
considers some limitations and new questions that arise from this study, as well as possible 
directions for future research.  
 
2. Focus, Demarcation and Research Questions  
 
Since the 1970s, when transboundary environmental problems first emerged on the 
international policy agenda, there has been a steady proliferation of inter-state, transnational 
and multi-level institutions, rules, mechanisms and processes intended to regulate or steer 
actors’ behavior towards better environmental management. The totality of these structures 
and processes comprise what is widely referred to as global environmental governance. In the 
1980s and 90s, the term was mostly applied by scholars studying international institutions and 
regimes established and operated by interdependent states (see Haas, Keohane and Levy, 
1993; Young, 1994; 1999). More recently, however, reflecting the vast increase in non-state 
actor participation in world politics over the past two decades, global environmental 
governance has come to be understood more broadly to include an array of different actors: 
states, inter-governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
corporations and industry associations and public-private partnerships, among others 
(Biermann, 2004; Lemos and Agrawal, 2006; Ruggie, 2004; UNEP, 2010). Moreover, 
defining environmental governance as global, as opposed to using the term international, 
appreciates the shortcomings of traditional state-centric analyses and separation between 
domestic and international politics in international relations theory. Indeed, as an empirical 
concept, environmental governance has evolved into a transnational1 and multi-level complex, 
which ties together different state and non-state actors, processes and structures at multiple 
levels ranging from the local, though the national and regional to the international.  
The overall aim of this dissertation is to further develop our understanding of the pre-
conditions and dynamics of change and progress in terms of one aspect of environmental 
governance: the negotiation and creation of environmental rules and regulations. Regulation 
                                                
1 Transnational relations is defined as regulator interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is 
a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or intergovernmental organization 
(Risse-Kappen, 1995) 
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may be defined as the organization and control of economic, political and social activities by 
means of making, implementing, monitoring and enforcing of rules (Mattli and Woods, 
2010). In multi-level environmental governance, the complex panoply of rules governing a 
particular issue area derive from international, rule-based agreements and institutions and 
their translation into national law, regional agreements establishing overarching regulatory 
structures or linked systems of national policy, and linked or co-evolved national or sub-
national policies. 
Previous literatures have established that business plays an important role in 
environmental rule making. Corporations and industry associations lobby decision-makers in 
order to influence the negotiation of institutions and regulations, and are also featured 
prominently in their implementation (Fuchs, 2007; Levy and Newell, 2005; Falkner, 2003; 
2008; Rowlands, 2001). Business organizations perform governance functions through private 
institutional arrangements that seek to mitigate the negative environmental impacts of 
business activities (Cashore, 2002; Clapp, 2005; Gulbrandsen, 2004; Wright and 
Rwabizambuga, 2006). Furthermore, governments depend on markets to implement 
regulations and provide technological solutions to environmental problems.  Markets depends 
on governments to maintain and create framework conditions that enable productivity, 
profitability and competitiveness. However, our understanding of the nature and effects of the 
interplay between states and markets remains underdeveloped.  
The agenda of this dissertation is to answer the following question: 
 
What mechanisms and dynamics emerge from the interplay between state and market actors 
and structures in multi-level environmental governance, and how may these mechanisms and 
dynamics generate conditions for political and regulatory change?  
 
This overarching research objective relates to a number of inquiries fundamental to the 
disciplines of political science and international relations: How do we conceptualize and 
understand policy and regulatory processes? What are the relationships and relative power of 
actors involved? How can the dynamics between different actors and processes help explain 
particular failures and successes in efforts to regulate solutions to environmental problems? 
 Moreover, this study focuses on one particularly salient, complex and crosscutting 
environmental governance problem: global climate change. Climate change is taken as an 
appropriate representation of wider environmental problems due to its all-encompassing 
8 
 
nature: effective mitigation requires a broad range of regulatory, technological and 
management strategies both upstream and downstream in such diverse sectors as agriculture, 
forestry, energy production, transportation, mining and industrial manufacturing. Climate 
change constitutes the main empirical focus of this dissertation, but the research also draws on 
the literature of regulatory formation in the case of ozone layer depletion. The example of 
ozone layer protection is discussed due to its similarities with climate change regarding the 
centrality of business in the international, regime-building process.  
To operationalize this broader research agenda, the study is organized around the 
following specific research questions:   
 
1. How and in what capacity do market actors influence the negotiation of rules and 
regulations designed to mitigate climate change? 
 
2. How are market-actor strategies vis-à-vis climate regulation constructed in response 
to the dynamics of nascent climate governance?   
 
3. How can the intersections between business strategies and climate governance affect 
development and change in business lobbying, political responses and regulatory 
formation?  
 
Moreover, the research addresses these questions by studying two different but interlinked 
political and rule-making processes that are essential to successful and effective mitigation of 
climate change:  
 
i) The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
 
ii) U.S. climate politics, including in particular the development of regulation and 
legislation in the U.S. House of Representatives, Senate and White House.  
 
The UNFCCC embodies what is commonly referred to as the international climate regime. 
The Convention, which was signed and ratified by nearly all the world’s states 1992, set up 
the basic institutions and processes allowing Parties to further negotiate international GHG 
regulations, which later resulted in the adoption of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2009 
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Copenhagen Accord. In the U.S, climate change has been on the political and legislative 
agenda since the 1980s.  While the U.S ratified the UNFCCC, it is not a party to the Kyoto 
Protocol, and it is widely acknowledged that U.S opposition to Kyoto and legally binding 
international commitments has severely hampered the effectiveness of the regime. Studying 
the dynamics of regulatory formation in the U.S can thus ultimately also help explain the 
failures and potential for success in regulatory formation at the international level. Previous 
studies have demonstrated that business lobbies have exercised considerable influence both in 
the international regime and US climate politics since the early 1990s, which renders both 
these cases particularly relevant for empirically studying change in business strategies and 
regulatory formation over time.  
This two-level approach departs from the notion that international regimes and 
domestic politics are intimately linked or entangled. Government preferences, positions and 
negotiating leverage in international negotiations are often determined by domestic politics; 
that is, they are determined by the extent to which domestic constituencies and institutions 
support or oppose regulatory change (Drezner, 2007; DeSombre, 2000; Moravicsik, 1997; 
Putnam, 1988).  
The next section outlines the study’s methodological approach to developing 
conceptual knowledge and theory from these case studies, and presents its concrete strategy 
for collecting and analyzing empirical data.  
 
 
3. Theory Development, Data Analysis and Data Collection  
 
This study employs an inductive approach to theory development in line with Glaser and 
Strauss’ (1967) doctrine for developing substantive grounded theory in qualitative research. 
In contrast to deductive research methodologies, which seek to obtain new facts to test, verify 
or falsify existing theories and concepts, substantive grounded theory2 is generated 
inductively from empirical data. A grounded theory approach recognizes that the researcher’s 
                                                
2 Theory is defined by Glaser and Strauss as a strategy for handling data in research, which provides modes of 
conceptualization for describing and explaining (1967:3). Theory, furthermore, has the following purposes: 1) 
To enable prediction and explanation of behavior, 2) to be useful in theoretical advances, 3) to be useful to 
practitioners seeking to control situations, 4) to provide a perspective on behavior, and 5) to guide and provide 
style for research on particular areas of behavior.  
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a priori knowledge of the most pertinent hypotheses, concepts and theoretical postulations 
may be limited. Indeed, the belief that existing, formal theories can be applied directly to a 
substantive area, “often lead[s] to a forcing of data as well as the neglect of relevant concepts 
and hypotheses that may emerge” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967:34). Thus, instead of letting 
existing theories guide the research, the researcher should seek to develop, extend and refine 
emerging analytical themes, categories and hypotheses throughout the data collection process 
(Charmaz, 2001; 2006; Glaser and Strauss, 1967).  
 The development of hypotheses, concepts and a theoretical framework in this 
dissertation is consistent with a grounded theory approach. The processes of data collection 
and data analysis are not conducted separately but simultaneously from early phases and 
throughout the research process. This rolling analysis is reflected in the organization and 
publication order of the journal articles.  The empirical research conducted in first case study3 
to a large extent provided the basis for developing an understanding of the most significant 
and interesting processes and puzzles for study: namely, the nature and causes of the apparent 
strategic shift in the strategies of a critical mass of dominant business lobbies, and the impact 
of the strategic shift on political and regulatory formation over time. This finding spurred 
further empirical research and the development of an analytical framework in the second 
article.4 While some existing analytical approaches were helpful in guiding this research 
agenda, indeed, no one approach could have provided an appropriate analytical model a 
priori.  
In order to gather the necessary empirical data for conducting case studies and 
developing conceptual and theoretical knowledge—i.e. data collection—this study adopts a 
strategy of methodological triangulation (Denzin, 1978; Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
Triangulation is a strategy that seeks to ensure data reliability by combining different 
qualitative methodologies, including interviewing, participant observation and documentary 
analysis. Methodological triangulation seeks to capitalize on each method’s relative strengths 
while hedging their weaknesses and limitations.  
                                                
3 The Influence of Business and Industry NGOs in the Negotiation of the Kyoto Mechanisms: the Case of 
Carbon Capture and Storage in the CDM 
4 States and markets in global environmental governance: The role of tipping points in international regime 
formation. 
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A substantial share of the empirical material gathered for this research has been 
generated through qualitative interviewing. Qualitative interviewing is a method that can be 
particularly useful for providing ‘thick descriptions’ of social phenomena, and for explaining 
how social processes transpire and why things change (Rubin and Rubin, 2005). Furthermore, 
interviewing can provide rigorous information about relevant actors and processes, the 
relationships between them, and the underlying motivations causing behaviors in particular 
social contexts (Bauer, 2000:39).  
There are many different approaches to interviewing. One of the main distinctions can 
be drawn between a ‘structured’ interview, where a series of predetermined and standardized 
questions are posed to the informant, and an ‘unstructured’ interview, where the researcher 
assumes a rather passive role by letting the informant guide the direction of the conversation 
(Andersen, 2006:279; Bauer, 2000:38; Pawson, 1996:297). A structured approach is often 
used in quantitative survey research, and aims to generate objective and unbiased facts 
through the application of specific interview techniques.5 The informant is understood as a 
data-carrying entity, that is, a ‘passive vessel of answers’ or a repository containing relevant 
information (Gubrium and Holstein, 2001:13). Structures interviews are appropriate when a 
researcher knows all the relevant questions ex ante to interviews. In the present case, which is 
riddled with ever-changing business and governance variables, no researcher could know all 
the appropriate interviews questions, concepts or analytical approaches a priori, so more 
flexibility is required. From a grounded theory perspective, the need to explore different 
analytical opportunities during the data-collection process thus renders the structured 
approach to interviewing both unfeasible and unproductive in this case. 
This study adopts a less rigid approach to interviewing; that is, the semi-structured 
model. This approach has the researcher prepare a set of themes, issues or questions to be 
covered during the interview, but leaves space and time open to adjust the sequence and 
nature of the questions throughout (Kvale, 1997; Rubin and Rubin, 2005:4). Semi-structured 
interviews also enable the researcher to pursue unanticipated issues and information raised by 
the informant (Bauer, 2000; Kvale, 1997:72). Such interviews might be described as  
                                                
5 Each informant is presented with exactly the same questions and in the same order to enable aggregation and 
comparison between sample subgroups and/or different survey periods. 
 
12 
 
conversational, because data is constructed through the dynamic interplay and exchange of 
knowledge, information and ideas between the interviewee and the interviewer (Holstein and 
Gubrium, 2002:113; Kvale, 1997:29; Pawson, 1996:298).  
More specifically, the method adopted here also draw on a style of interviewing 
particularly useful for developing substantial grounded theory: the ‘theory-driven’ 
conversational interview. Using this strategy, the researcher selects key informants presumed 
to be particularly knowledgeable on issues being researched (Kumar et al., 1993:1634),  and 
uses the informant’s knowledge to help confirm, falsify and refine the researcher’s own 
theory (Pawson, 1996:299). The researcher actively invites the informant to share information 
relevant to understanding the case, to deliberate on the role of specific factors and variables in 
creating particular behavioral, social and/or political outcomes, and to comment upon the 
researchers conceptual framework, hypotheses and proposed explanations (Pawson, 
1996:305-306). As such, the interview may help the researcher explore, critically examine or 
test the validity of his/her own research questions, hypotheses and theoretical postulations 
(Andersen, 2006:280-282). Therefore, the theory-driven conversational model can—in line 
with the grounded theory approach—allow for ideas, issues, concepts and hypotheses to 
emerge from interviewing. This approach arguably also enhances analytical control and 
validity, as the relevance of the information and the conceptual framework is constantly 
assessed throughout the data-collection process (Andersen, 2006). 
Studies of complex empirical fields such as business lobbying and regulatory 
formation involve an immensurable number of actors with whom it may be difficult to secure 
interviews and with whom much relevant information may be regarded as sensitive. In these 
situations, carrying-out a statistically representative survey of key informants is not a prudent 
plan. For this reason, but also in line with the prescribed methodology of theory-driven 
interviewing, the strategy adopted here selects informants not based on statistical 
representativeness, but because they are deemed particularly resourceful, knowledgeable and 
experienced in the field (see Kumar et al. 1993:1634). Here, such key-informants were 
identified among heads and staff of business associations and NGOs, corporate lobbyists, 
CEOs of large corporations and government decision-makers. In the early phases of the 
research process, interviewing these key informants proved essential to developing a 
contextual understanding and formulating interesting and rigorous research questions and 
hypotheses, as well as getting relevant and publicly unattainable information. As the process 
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evolved and a conceptual framework emerged, these could be tested, discussed and refined 
through continued interviewing.  
Ensuring that the information provided through interviewing is reliable represents a 
challenge. When using key informants, who are generally intelligent, articulate and 
accustomed to liaising with political and social elites, there is a danger that the researcher may 
lose control over the interview situation (Andersen, 2006:282). Furthermore, informants may 
consciously retain information, evoke incomplete and biased recollections of actions and/or 
events, overstate their own role and importance, and/or favor certain memories over others 
(Andersen, 2006:292-293). Therefore, it is imperative that the researcher critically scrutinizes 
the extent to which the data can be deemed a reliable account of reality (Andersen, 2006:283).  
As mentioned initially, a good strategy for dealing with these problems is to use 
multiple data-sources and methods in combination. This study also draws on years of 
participant observation in the international climate negotiations6 to compliment the 
information gathered through interviewing. Some argue that participant observation can yield 
a more objective account of reality, enabling the researcher to document exactly what happens 
(Becker and Greer, 1957). However, this postulation rests on a rather naïve assumption that 
while the accounts of informants may be subject to ‘distortion’ through subjectivity and bias, 
the researcher’s observation is somehow immune to distortion. Data collected through 
participant observation too represents an interpretation of social reality (Atkinson and Coffey 
2001). Nevertheless, the inherent element of subjectivity in qualitative reporting of social 
events, be it through interviewing or observation, does not necessarily mean that such 
methods cannot provide factual information. For example, if information is institutionally 
entrenched, such as position and rank within an organization or the sequence of events, they 
can be deemed as factual (see Andersen 2006:284). Furthermore, some descriptions and 
observations of the social world may be regarded as true because they are shared by a 
significant number of actors within a given context. Clearly, collective descriptions and views 
                                                
6 By receiving formal accreditation to the UNFCCC through the International Chamber of Commerce, I was able 
to participate not only in the formal, rule-making processes, but also to attend and observe many closed, strategy 
meetings within and between business lobbies.  This proved extremely helpful for developing an understanding 
of the field, schedule interviews and formulate research hypotheses and questions to be posed in interviews.  
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represent shared meaning and interpretation of social phenomena, but can still assume a type 
and degree of veracity precisely when they are shared across time and space.   
When the researcher is able to observe some of the social or political processes as well 
as interview key informants about them, observation can also be used as a reference point 
against which statements by informants can be judged. The researcher must recognize that 
his/her own observation—to the same extent as for informants—constitutes an interpretation. 
Nevertheless, it can serve as a valuable complement to interview data. In some cases, when 
informants’ statements deviate from the researcher’s observations and interpretation, the 
researcher must critically question and analyze whether his/her own understanding, as well as 
the accounts of informants, represent a reliable description of the social processes studied.  
Finally, as a complement to interviewing and participant observation, this study also 
draws on the extensive documentary analysis of both primary and secondary sources. These 
include mainly draft texts from political, regulatory and legislative negotiations, actor position 
statements, lobbying materials, strategy documents, finalized political and regulatory 
agreements, newsletters, press releases and media reports. Some of these documents are 
publicly available, while some are not. All documents used are appropriately referenced in the 
articles.  
 
4. Literature Review  
 
This section reviews and discusses selections of existing literature that are analytically 
relevant to this dissertation’s research agenda. The literature is grouped according to two 
broad analytical aims: i) To assess and analyze the influences and drivers of business 
activities and strategies in environmental governance, and ii) to analyze and explain processes 
of political change and regulatory formation in the environmental policy domain.  The 
conceptual framework and theory developed in this dissertation builds on and lends insights to 
the literature, but may also be distinguished from existing scholarship. These existing 
analytical approaches are next discussed in terms of their relevance and ability to help answer 
the questions guiding this dissertation research.  
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4.1 Business Power, Strategies and Global Environmental Governance  
 
Over the past decades there has been a proliferation of academic research on the role of 
business in global environmental governance. These studies build on a substantial foundation 
of studies within the discipline of international political economy (IPE), an increasingly 
recognized sub-stream of international relations. IPE first developed in the 1990s and was 
closely linked to debates on globalization and the alleged rise of market actors as powerful 
players in global politics (Dicken, 1998; Eden, 1993; Stopford and Strange, 1991; Strange, 
1996; 1988; 1996; Held et al, 1999). While the central focus of IPE scholarship remains on 
the interrelationship between public and private power, it has evolved into a rich and diverse 
discipline including an array of different theoretical and methodological approaches 
(Ravenhill, 2005; Stubbs and Underhill; 2000). What unites the IPE scholarship, however, 
and much of the literature on business and environmental governance within the IPE 
approach, is its analytical focus on structural power. The structural power of the market and 
market actors is derived from their position as the primary source of economic growth, 
employment and innovation in the modern capitalist societies. Because government 
legitimacy, authority and indeed re-election hinges on the functioning of markets to create 
jobs and taxable profits, states often seek to design policies and regulation that do not unduly 
harm economic interests. As such, the structural power of business may have a disciplining 
effect on politics, and limit the range and availability of feasible policy and regulatory options 
(see Bachrach, 1967; Bachrach and Baratz, 1970; Lukes, 1974). In environmental governance, 
this implies that the leverage of regulators is constrained by the need to impose rules that are 
“market friendly.”  
One particularly notable approach to analyzing business strategies and environmental 
governance within the IPE discipline is the so-called Neo-Gramsican Framework. Building 
on almost a decade of research (e.g. Levy and Egan, 1998; 2003; Levy and Kolk, 2002; Levy 
and Prakesh, 2003; Newell, 2000; 2001; 2003, Newell and Paterson, 1998), David L. Levy 
and Peter J. Newell present an interdisciplinary and multi-level framework that draws on 
international relations and business management and organization literatures, while 
combining political macro-level analysis and company-level studies (Levy and Newell, 2005; 
see also Newell and Levy, 2006).  
16 
 
 The framework builds on two central concepts borrowed from the Marxist philosopher 
Gramsci; the notions of hegemony and historical blocks.  Hegemony is defined as the unison 
of economic, political, ideological aims and beliefs amongst members of a dominant class or 
group who exercise leadership in society. An alliance of political, economic and social forces 
as such is defined as an historical block. An historic block forms the basis of consent to 
certain social orders, which produce and re-produce hegemony through the coercive and 
bureaucratic authority of state institutions, dominance in the economic realm, and the 
consensual legitimacy of civil society (See Levy and Newell, 2005:50). The authors use the 
concept of hegemony and historical blocks to conceptualize how environmental problems are 
governed, and the role of markets and market actors in this process. Environmental 
governance structures such as regimes and institutions are viewed as the result of processes of 
bargaining, compromise and alliance formation over ideas, goals and regulatory designs 
between a variety of actors, including states, transnational organizations, business and 
industry associations and civil society groups. This bargaining process is embedded within 
broader power relations and structures, and is not a pluralistic contest among equals. As such, 
regimes and other governance complexes reflect the relative power, resources, preferences 
and strategies of the actors involved, while at the same time being shaped and constrained by 
broader macro-structures such as production relations and ideological formations. It is the 
structural power of markets and market actors in the construction of hegemonic fields—that 
is, the materialization dominant ideas, aims and beliefs regarding how to deal with 
environmental problems—that enable business to keep issues off the agenda, limit the range 
of policy options, and ‘capture’ regulatory development by recognizing only market-friendly 
responses.   
 The Neo-Gramscian framework recognizes that both structure and agency influence 
the formation of environmental governance systems. Yet, agency itself appears to be 
conceptualized as structurally determined. The interests of actors reflect those of historical 
blocks and abide the confines of hegemonic fields.  While Levy and Newell acknowledge the 
role of firm-level drivers in strategy construction, including factors such as the costs and 
benefits of collective political action or the need to manage compliance costs and 
opportunities (see Getz, 1997; Mahon, 1983; Leone, 1986; Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; 
Schaffer 1992), they criticize the business-management literature for its failure to capture how 
interests and strategies are embedded in hegemonic fields and thus determined by the norms, 
goals and preferences of which it is constituted. As such, hegemonic fields and historical 
17 
 
blocks establish the limits and possibilities for strategy construction. Based on this notion, 
Levy and Newell argue that the trend towards greener business management represent a more 
fundamental change than a simple attempt at corporate greenwashing. Rather, it should be 
seen as an effort to accommodate new structural conditions derived from the growing 
consensus and pressure regarding the need to mitigate environmental problems (Levy and 
Newell, 2005:58-59). In Gramscian terms, it represents an accommodationist strategy of 
‘passive revolution,’ an attempt by dominant actors to absorb social pressures and protect 
their positions (Levy and Newell, 2005:64).  
 Levy and Newell’s account of how business strategies are structurally determined by 
the emerging field of environmental governance provides a timely correction to more 
simplistic firm-level conceptualizations. Yet, Levy and Newell’s framework suffers from at 
least three shortcomings: i) it lacks a precise notion of exactly how strategies are constructed 
in response to evolving environmental governance structures; ii) it makes little room for 
agency beyond or outside the margins of hegemonic fields; and, iii) by its a priori assumption 
of business power, it posits a rather deterministic account of regulatory outcomes. By 
conceptualizing regime formation as a path-dependent process embedded in structural 
conditions and relations of power, the neo-Gramsican framework fails to account for the 
drivers and conditions of trajectory change in regulatory formation.   
   
Another notable approach to analyzing business strategies and global environmental 
governance is the neo-pluralist perspective. In contrast to the IPE scholarship’s focus on 
structural power, it views global politics as a pluralistic field where power is dispersed more 
equally among a range of different agents. The relative power of actors to shape policy 
outcomes is determined by the particular range of constraints and opportunities pertaining to 
the given issue-area (Cerny, 2010:4). Since business groups compete with other actors for 
influence, their power to determine outcomes cannot be established a priori and must be 
treated as an empirical and issue-specific question (Falkner, 2008). However, neo-pluralism 
incorporates critiques against traditional pluralism’s failure to account for structural power by 
treating business as ‘privileged’ interest groups (Falkner, 2008; Lindblom, 1977; McFarland, 
2004).  
While recognizing that power exists and works in various forms (Barnett and Duvall, 
2005), neo-pluralists invoke a more empirical and pragmatic approach, which conceptualizes 
power and influence as something relational. Relational power may be defined as: A having 
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the power to get B to do something that B would not otherwise do (Dahl, 1957). In other 
words, relational power means the capability to realize intended outcomes through exercising 
influence. Influence occurs when the activities of actor A bring about intended effects in the 
behavior of actor B (Vormedal, 2008:44). This capability is often determined by resources 
such as money and knowledge. Thus, a relational approach conceives of power and influence 
as observable concepts traceable to an actor’s behavior.  In the study of business power, it 
directs researchers towards tracing causal links between business strategies and activities, and 
political and regulatory outcomes (Falkner, 2008). 
This section reviews the neo-pluralist approach to analyzing business strategies and 
environmental governance developed by Robert Falkner (2008). Falkner questions the 
structuralist assumption that globalization has led to an increase in business power vis-à-vis 
states and other non-state actors. Firstly, there is little evidence of globalization having caused 
a regulatory race to the bottom in the field of environmental governance. Second, economic 
integration has also led to the increasing pluralization of world politics and generated new 
forms of transnational political agency, involving an array different actors and groups seeking 
to influence political outcomes (Cerny, 2010). It has been widely demonstrated that 
transnational civil society groups and networks successfully influence international policy-
making and challenge corporate power through new forms of civil regulation and private 
governance mechanisms (see e.g. Keck and Sikkink 1998; Khagram et al 2000; Bendell, 
2004; McComeric 1999). As Cerny (2003:156) argues, this pattern of transnational 
interaction, competition and alliance formation has created a more open and fluid process of 
global politics.  
Falkner argues that business may be in a powerful, even privileged, position vis-à-vis 
other actors in global environmental governance; however business does not have a dominant 
influence over outcomes.  Countervailing forces limit its influence, such as civil-society 
activism and the resilience of state power. But most importantly, business power is 
constrained by divisions and conflict within the business sector itself (Falkner, 2008:17).  
Business is often divided on policy issues, and cannot be treated as a monolithic bloc. 
Business conflict emerges in global environmental politics due to the differential effects of 
international regulations on disparate corporations, sectors and industries. Environmental 
regulations usually target specific industries or sectors, limit existing markets, or generate 
new markets.  This may create uneven effects on business overall, leading to diverging 
interests and likely conflict.  
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Falkner identifies three main forms of business conflict over international regulation 
and regime building (2008:33-34). First, conflicts may arise between national and 
international firms. Global corporations are more likely than national firms to support the 
creation of international rules.  Global corporations stand to benefit because international 
regulation can reduce the transaction costs of operating in multiple regulatory environments, 
and can also level the playing field for companies operating in countries with fewer and laxer 
environmental standards (Vogel, 1995). Second, conflicts arise between technological leaders 
and laggards. Within the same industrial sector, companies’ ability to comply with new 
environmental standards is likely to be uneven. While market leaders in environmentally-
friendly technologies may support regulation due to their competitive advantage, laggards are 
more likely to oppose them. Third, business conflict can also emerge between companies 
linked together in supply or production chains. Regulation is likely to have differential effects 
on companies operating along the production chain, or companies with varied levels of 
vertical integration, which may lead to divisions and conflict between them. For example, 
corporations at the consumer end of the chain may support regulation as part of a strategy to 
enhance their reputation amongst consumers. In contrast, those companies producing raw 
materials or other intermediary products used by the retailers may face higher compliance 
costs without gaining reputational benefits, and are therefore likely to resist regulation. In 
sum, while business conflict cannot be assumed a priori and must be treated as an empirical, 
issue-specific question, it constitutes a latent threat to business unity and thus to the corporate 
lobby’s ability to influence regulatory developments.  
 Falkner argues that there are mainly two strands of thinking important to 
understanding how corporate preferences are constructed. First, the competitive position of a 
given company or industry in global markets, and the effect that new regulation may have on 
this position, provides a major indicator of interests and regulatory preferences. As such, 
preferences are determined by economic interests, which translate into lobbying strategies vis-
à-vis regulatory processes. In the environmental domain, we may expect firms to evaluate the 
impact regulatory proposals would have on their competitive position and their ability to 
adapt through technological innovation and change. Second, the institutional environments 
that surround corporations also influence preference formation. The values of corporate 
leaders, the firm’s the organizational culture and the shared ideas, norms and understandings 
of business associations and networks, often provide a filter through which economic interests 
are perceived. Thus, a firm’s social and institutional environments influence interpretations of 
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economic interests. Falkner therefore argues that analyses of interest must be sensitive to both 
economic and institutional dimensions (2008:37). 
Falkner’s neo-pluralist account offers a less deterministic, more nuanced and precise 
account of how corporate strategies are constructed, as well as the conditions for business 
influence in environmental governance. The focus on conflicts that may emerge within and 
between business sectors, groups and individual corporations is useful not only in terms of 
emphasizing that business interests and power should not be assumed a priori, but is also 
useful for developing our understanding of the dynamics behind strategy construction. 
Falkner’s approach shows that business groups may oppose or support regulation, depending 
on current competition and conflict within the business community and depending on the 
extent to which regulations might limit or advance competitive positioning and economic 
interests. While this approach provides valuable input to this dissertation’s attempt to 
conceptualize processes of corporate strategy construction, it cannot explain how and why 
strategies change over time, and furthermore how the dynamics between strategic engagement 
and political and regulatory processes can generate conditions for change.  
 The next section reviews a selection of existing analytical approaches that focuses 
more directly on conceptualizing regulatory formation and change.  
 
 
4.2.  Conceptualizing and Explaining the Formation of Global Regulation   
 
The literature on international regimes includes the first selection of relevant analytical 
models. Regime theory, which first developed during the 1980s and 90s, gives an essentially 
state-centric account of failures and successes in international rule-based cooperation. A 
consensus definition of “regimes” first appeared in a special issue of International 
Organization in 1982; as sets of “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations” (Krasner, 1983: 2). However, some argue for a more precise definition 
of regimes as formal, regulatory agreements (Breitmeier et al., 2006) “with explicit rules, 
agreed upon by governments, that pertain to particular sets of issues in international relations” 
(Keohane, 1989: 4). The regime school has developed into a comprehensive research program 
which, for decades, has provided the major locus of theorizing on international regulation.  
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More recently, the regime scholarship has rightly received extensive criticism for its 
state-centricity and failure to account for the role played by non-state actors in the bargaining 
and formation of regulatory institutions (Arts, 2000; Newell, 2000; Josselin and Wallace, 
2001). While the applicability of regime theory to the research agenda of this dissertation is 
therefore limited, there are nevertheless some insights to be drawn from the scholarship’s 
notion of factors that may inhibit or enable successful regime formation.  
Central to this research program are attempts to explain why states sometimes succeed 
and sometimes fail to establish effective institutions for dealing with environmental problems. 
According to a neo-liberal, interest-based model, which view states as utility-maximizing 
agents, regimes are most likely to come into existence when advantages exceed anticipated 
costs. That is, regimes form when they are “expected to increase the welfare of the creators” 
(Keohane, 1984: 80; see also Hasenclever et al., 1997: 37).   
One particularly notable and influential neo-liberal account is Oran Young’s 
framework for analyzing institutional bargaining (Young, 1989; 1994; and Young and 
Osherenko, 1993). In contrast to other neo-liberal models, Young’s approach seeks more 
explicitly to account for the factors that enable or deter efforts of utility-maximizing agents to 
realize feasible mutual gains through regimes. According to Young, regimes are firstly most 
likely to materialize when the issues at hand “lend themselves to treatment in a contractarian 
mode” (Young, 1994: 107). A contractarian environment implies that actors bargain under a  
“veil of uncertainty.” Because the distribution of negative impacts are unknown, states will 
seek to realize an agreement that is fair to all, “in a sense that patterns of outcomes generated 
under such arrangements will be broadly acceptable, regardless of where the participant might 
be located in such outcomes” (Young, 1994: 102). A veil of “good” uncertainty is therefore 
thought to facilitate institutional formation. Secondly, regimes are most likely to form when 
the primary concerns of all participating states are treated fairly, and the resulting design of 
the regulatory agreement is widely perceived as equitable. Thirdly, the existence of certain 
change-events — such as exogenous shocks, salient solutions to the problem,  or clear-cut, 
reliable and effective compliance mechanisms—may increase the probability of successful 
regime formation. Finally, the absence of effective leadership, provided by states, 
international organizations or individuals, may severely hamper prospects of achieving an 
agreement (Young, 1994: 109-114).  
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Neo-realist and cognitivist regime scholars provide alternative conceptualizations of 
regime formation. Neo-realists view the leadership of a hegemon as a necessary condition for 
regime establishment, and believe that institutional arrangements are most likely to emerge 
when powerful states make the effort to create them (Hasenclever, 1997: 86; Gilpin, 1987; 
Grieco, 1988). Cognitivists, on the other hand, suggest a more knowledge-based model, which 
underscore the centrality of belief systems, decision cultures, and social learning in 
determining the success or failure of regime formation. Learning about the problems at hand 
and their appropriate responses may contribute to the development of consensual knowledge 
and thus agreement on suitable institutional arrangements to deal with them (See E. Haas, 
1990; P. Haas, 1992).  
As previously noted, because these models fail to account for functions played by non-
state actors such as business, they also fail to address potential conditions for change that may 
origin from markets and/or the intersection between state and business preferences. While 
Young’s notions of equity, fairness and feasibility as central premises for successful regime 
formation provides an important insight helpful to developing our understanding of regime 
formation, it fails to consider the extent to which successful institutional agreements must also 
be perceived by market actors as equitable, fair and feasible. 
Another notable and more recent contribution to the literature on global regulatory 
formation is Daniel Drezner’s (2007) theory of regulatory outcomes. Drezner argues that 
while globalization has empowered non-state actors, governments remain the primary agents 
who write the rules that regulate the global economy. Drezner, building on a “two-step” or 
“two-level games” approach to international relations theory (Legro, 1996; Legro and 
Moravcsik, 1999; Moravcsik, 1997; Putnam, 1988), argues that the key variable affecting 
regulatory outcomes is the distribution of interests among great powers. By positing great 
power cooperation of mutual interest as both a necessary and sufficient condition for 
regulatory formation (2007:5), Drezner reaffirms the main tenants of the realist scholarship. 
But the framework also differs significantly from the realist model. Drezner argues 
that a state’s regulatory preferences can be derived from domestic conditions, in particular 
political economy. The preferences of domestic actors and institutions can be used to explain 
state interests, positions and bargaining outcomes in international negotiations (Drezner, 
2007:6). Drezner identifies the regulatory preferences of domestic business and industry as 
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the most important fons et orgio of state positions. If the compliance and adjustment costs 
associated with a regulatory proposal are high, business and industry groups are likely to 
organize and exercise political voice to protect the regulatory status quo. It should be noted 
that some businesses are also likely to benefit from and therefore support global regulation. 
For example, multinational companies may prefer uniform international standards over varied 
national policies, because regulatory consistency permits standardized production processes, 
fewer compliance risks and costs, and capital planning around predictable regulatory 
environments (2007: 43-45). Yet, Drezner argues that, in most instances, the costs of 
implementing global regulations are greater than the benefits. If the proposed regulation 
affects immobile factors of production such as land and labor, or asset specific investments 
such as mature and non-tradable sectors, then compliance and adjustment costs may be 
comparatively high. Furthermore, older sectors and regulatory problems tend toward more use 
of political voice by affected industries, and more adjustment costs for governments, as 
compared to newer sectors with newly understood environmental risks (2007:59). When 
governments face domestic actors that strongly oppose regulatory change, the perceived 
adjustment costs of global regulation are very likely to outweigh the perceived benefits 
(2007:46-51).  
In sum, while Drezner argues that preferences of the most powerful states determine 
regulatory outcomes at the international level, his model also acknowledges—at least 
implicitly—how the preferences of business groups and governments intersect and create 
conditions that may inhibit or enable regulatory change at the global level.  
Another notable approach to analyzing global regulatory formation has also recently 
been developed by Walter Mattli and Ngaire Woods (2010). This framework, the politics of 
global regulation, accounts more explicitly for the plurality of actors engaged in international 
regulatory processes, and captures a broader set of variables for explaining regulatory 
formation than do state-centric models. The framework specifies under what conditions global 
regulatory change is likely to occur, and distinguishes between two types of likely regulatory 
outcomes.  
First, regulatory change may result in “capture,” that is, when the regulatory status quo 
benefits only narrow and vested interest. Capture is more precisely defined as the control of 
the regulatory process by those—or a narrow subset of those—affected by regulation 
(2010:12).  The result of capture can either be i) the absence of regulation which would 
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impose costs on regulated groups, or ii) regulation that does not safeguard social preferences, 
or iii) non-enforceable regulation, or, finally, iv) regulation that eliminates competition for 
regulated groups. Second, regulatory change may result in common-interest regulation, that is, 
regulation that benefits society and achieves a wider public purpose. Due-process principles 
such as inclusiveness, openness, transparency, fairness and accessibility for all affected 
parties in the negotiation process makes outcomes less prone to capture, but cannot alone 
ensure a common-interest outcome (2010:12-15). 
 Regulatory change and the type of regulatory outcomes may also be understood as the 
result of a combination of institutional supply- and demand-side conditions. Institutional 
supply refers to the institutional context of regulation: how and where rules are drafted, 
implemented, monitored and enforced. The institutional context may be limited, which 
indicates that negotiating forums are club-like, exclusive, closed and secretive. Such forums 
would be at risk of capture. Extensive institutional context, as mentioned above, suggests that 
proper due process, open forums, multiple access points and oversight mechanisms will 
increase the likelihood of common interest regulation. But even with the supply of an 
extensive institutional context, demand-side conditions must be satisfied to ensure common-
interest regulation. Demand signifies the extent to which societal groups are likely to be 
willing to push for regulatory change through participation in the different stages7 of the 
regulatory process. First, actors may be motivated by the diffusion of information about the 
social cost of regulatory capture or lack of regulation. Public outcry can trigger regulatory 
change; a demonstration effect most apparent when the media reports major crises, disasters 
or scandals in the context of inadequate regulation.  However, while demonstration effects 
may initiate and create momentum for change, they may not be enough to sustain it. The 
public attention on any one story or cause is not immune to the transitory and sound-bite-
oriented news cycle, which can forget a crisis as quickly as it can construct one. Therefore, 
effective change is dependent on demand from resourceful, expert, well-organized and 
committed pressure groups to ensure that defenders of the status quo do not undermine efforts 
to negotiate and implement new regulation. As such, another key demand-side condition is the 
existence of interests, that is, actors and alliances willing and able to push for regulatory 
change.  
                                                
7 The stages of regulatory processes are agenda setting, negotiation, implementation, monitoring and 
enforcement  
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Mattli and Woods list three main categories of regulatory entrepreneurs. The first 
category that plays a prominent role in rule-making and implementation is non-governmental 
entrepreneurs, including watchdog or public-interest lobbies, international NGOs and other 
civil society networks and coalitions.  Yet, many NGOs are not nearly as well-funded as 
industry lobbies, and lack the formal authority of public officials. Therefore, it might be 
argued that pressure from non-governmental agents is most effective in the agenda-setting 
phase, and that they lack sufficient resources, expertise and authority to importantly influence 
implementation and enforcement (2010:29).8 The second category of entrepreneurs that have 
been successful in influencing regulatory outcomes is public officials, including judges, 
legislators and bureaucrats. Indeed, public officials have the resources, expertise and authority 
to affect regulation beyond the agenda-setting phase. While public officials can be subject to 
capture, they can also use their authority to ensure that regulations meet the social interest. 
The final often-overlooked category, according to Mattli and Woods, is the private sector. 
Corporations and business associations are often the most influential entrepreneurs because 
they possess the necessary resources to monitor and participate in regulatory negotiation 
processes over time, and because their level of relevant knowledge and expertise of regulatory 
design is often higher than that of NGOs and government officials.  
Mattli and Woods propose four categories of corporate entrepreneurs with an incentive 
to organize and lobby in support for new regulation: I) Corporate consumers: Firms that are 
negatively affected by regulations and seek to protect the producers of goods and services that 
they depend on. II) Corporate newcomers:  Firms who enter the market after capture 
regulation has been negotiated, which seek to abolish regulation that allows established firms 
to control entry and retard growth of new firms. III) Corporations at risk: Actors whose 
economic viability or survival depend on new regulatory models. With a significant increase 
in risks related to the regulatory status quo, affected corporate actors are likely to support 
regulatory change. Insurers, who have an incentive to reduce claims risk, or firms who have 
suffered accidents resulting from lack of safety standards, are examples of corporations at 
risk. IV) Corporate levelers of the playing field: Firms who face more stringent or costly 
regulation to which their competitors in other countries or regions are exempt. These firms are 
likely to lobby decision-makers for more wide-reaching regulation.  
                                                
8 Note that there is a vast literature on NGO influence which argues otherwise REFS 
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 The final category of demand-side conditions is ideas, which Mattli and Woods argue 
may have a more lasting impact on regulatory change. Crises, failures and public outrage may 
bring together alliances of entrepreneurs who pressure for regulatory change. This unified 
front may constrain interests and agents of capture, but it does not guarantee that their 
preferences change. Even if there are influential entrepreneurs working for change, the 
regulatory process is vulnerable to back-sliding if the pro-change-group pressure diminishes. 
On the other hand, a more fundamental shift in ideas or the emergence of new ideas can have 
a more powerful effect on change if those ideas reshape the preferences of capture actors. 
New ideas often emerge as a result of decreasing legitimacy and failure of the old set of ideas 
—usually invoked by a crisis or disaster—which underpin status-quo regulation. Ideas also 
provide a basis for the formation of coalitions among entrepreneurs pressing for regulatory 
change. 
 The framework presented by Mattli and Woods provides a useful reminder of how 
different actors and conditions influence regulatory formation. In the context of this 
dissertation’s research agenda, the focus on market actors as regulatory entrepreneurs is 
particularly constructive. Drezner also acknowledge the role of business preferences in 
defining state interests, but his assertion that governments are mostly responsive to and 
captured by industry that stand to loose from regulation renders his argument somewhat 
limited. Indeed, the a priori assumption that market actors are most likely to resist new 
regulation and defend the status quo represents an oversimplification and overlooks the 
potentially powerful role played by businesses with an incentive to support regulatory change. 
While Mattli and Woods’ recognition of business groups as potential pro-change coalitions is 
known to the global governance literature, the notion and implications of business lobbies as 
regulatory entrepreneurs has been less recognized and explored.  
 It should be noted that the debate on the role of business lobbies in global regulatory 
change also build on a wealth of political science research on interest groups and domestic 
regulation and from the 1960s, 70s and 80s (see for example Olson, 1965; Stigler, 1971; 
Becker, 1983; Posner, 1974; Wilson, 1974; 1980). Most of these literatures depart from a 
public-choice-theory perspective, which argues that politicians are motivated mainly by self-
interest, and that collective decision-making processes should be understood as a constant-
sum bargaining process between actors seeking to maximize their own utility (Buchanan and 
Tullock, 1965). Special-interest theories of regulation focus on how interests groups such as 
business lobbies influence the regulatory process. Already in 1965, Mancur Olson 
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demonstrated how—due to the absence of incentives for collective organization—the 
activities of lobbies rarely represent or seek to advance some public good, but instead work to 
promote special and narrow interests that stand to excessively gain or lose from proposed 
regulatory change (Olson, 1965). Drawing on Olson’s work, James Wilson analyzes the 
conditions under which rent-seeking interest groups are likely to influence regulation to their 
favor. Wilson demonstrates that when costs and benefits are narrowly concentrated, the 
regulatory process is likely to be captured by small but politically powerful groups that 
engage in competitive lobbying. This debate on domestic interest groups constitutes an 
important backdrop for developing theory on business groups and the conditions for 
regulatory change at the global level.  
 The next section presents a summary of this Ph.D. research, focusing on the main 
findings, conceptual framework and conclusions. Subsequently, the chapter draws on the 
above literature review to discuss and establish the main contributions of this dissertation to 
the field.  
 
 
 
 
5. Summary of Dissertation Research 
 
The research of this PhD dissertation consists of three articles published or due for publication 
in peer-reviewed academic journals:  
1) The Influence of Business and Industry NGOs in the Negotiation of the Kyoto 
Mechanisms: the Case of Carbon Capture and Storage in the CDM  
2) States and Markets in Global Environmental Governance: The Role of Tipping Points 
in International Regime Formation 
3) From Foe to Friend? Business, the Tipping Point and U.S. Climate Politics 
 
Recalling the research agenda (pg. 6-7) the first article addresses research question 1) how 
and in what capacity do market actors influence the negotiation of rules and regulations 
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designed to mitigate climate change? Consistent with a grounded theory approach, it provides 
the initial empirical mapping and examination of the field of business lobbying vis-à-vis 
international climate regulation, and constitutes an important foundation for the subsequent 
articles in which the conceptual framework and approach is developed.  In short, this article 
examines how business groups organize and lobby negotiations of new rules and regulations 
in the international climate regime (UNFCCC).  It then conducts an assessment of business 
influence in a particular negotiation process, and evaluates the nature and source of business 
influence as such.  
More specifically, the article illustrates how the business and industry NGO (BINGO) 
constituency has, over time, evolved from constituting a united anti-regulation lobby 
representing mainly fossil-fuel intensive industries, to representing a larger and more diverse 
group of companies and business associations with different interests, strategies and views on 
GHG regulation. It places firms along a continuum from “gray” to “green”, with gray 
representing the most reactionary, anti-regulation groups and green the regulatory 
entrepreneurs. The categorization of lobbies as such illustrates that since the turn of the 
century, business political strategies have moved increasingly towards the greener end of the 
spectrum (Vormedal, 2008:37-44). It is argued that this trend reflects a more general shift in 
corporate strategies from opposition towards more accommodative and supportive approaches 
to climate change mitigation and regulation.  
 To assess business influence in the UNFCCC, the article develops a methodology that 
combines the assessment of BINGOs attempts to exercise influence (by looking at access, 
resources and activities) with the goal of revealing determinants both in relation to process 
and outcome (see Vormedal, 2008:44-49). The methodology is applied to a case study of 
BINGO influence in a particular negotiation between Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, in which 
governments consider the inclusion of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) as an eligible 
project activity under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The case demonstrates that 
BINGOs exercised considerable influence in the process of negotiating regulatory design, and 
indicates that BINGO lobbying also caused a change in the position of the group of African 
delegations, from being opposed to supporting the inclusion of CCS in the CDM (Vormedal, 
2008: 51-60) 
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 Based on the empirical assessment of BINGO activities, strategies and influences in 
the CCS negotiation process, the article concludes that the international dimension of business 
lobbying is increasingly relevant and important to the study of business power in 
environmental rule-making.  In contrast to previous research—which has argued that business 
lobbies prefer working at the national level where they enjoy more predictable and well-
chartered channels of influence—this article illustrates how BINGOs strategically utilize 
transnational networks and informal relationships with a multitude of developed- and 
developing-country delegations, as well as prominent staff in international institutions.  Thus, 
it demonstrates that international channels are frequently invoked to disseminate information 
about business preferences and put pressure on decision-makers, so as to influence regulatory 
processes and outcomes (Vormedal, 2008:49-60). It is also argued that business influence in 
international rule-making may be conceptualized as a form of corporate-technological power. 
Technological power is derived from business’ control and ownership of energy technologies, 
and its ability to draw on technological expertise and know-how in regulatory negotiations. 
Technological power as such provides business lobbies with particular capabilities and 
leverage vis-à-vis other non-state actors, and enables them to play a central role in the shaping 
of regulatory frameworks for climate-change mitigation (see Vormedal, 2008:61).  
 The second article departs from one central finding of the first article, namely, the 
cumulative shift towards accommodation, support and entrepreneurship vis-a-vis GHG 
regulation amongst dominant business lobbies at the international level. This observation 
raised the question of what factors and dynamics were causing the apparent strategic shift. 
Building on previous literature and data collection, the objective of the research process 
became developing a model that could explain this change and assess its effect on regulatory 
formation. The crystallization of the two guiding research questions—1) how are market-
actor strategies vis-à-vis climate regulation constructed in response to the dynamics of 
embryonic climate governance? and 2) how can the intersections between business strategies 
and climate governance affect development and change in business lobbying, political 
responses and regulatory formation?—led to the materialization of a model for understanding 
and analyzing how the interplay between state and market actors and structures in 
environmental governance generates conditions for political and regulatory change.  
 In short, the so-called Tipping Point Model (see Vormedal, 2011:5-12; and Vormedal, 
forthcoming) posits the following: In the initial phase of regime and regulatory formation, 
30 
 
government efforts to establish rules and regulations are prone to meet considerable resistance 
from business lobbies, especially from liable sectors facing large compliance and adjustment 
costs. However, under certain conditions that may emerge as a particular issue area of 
environmental governance matures, business opposition is likely to decrease, become more 
fragmented and ultimately shift towards regulatory support. The model identifies three 
particularly important conditions that, if emerging or present, may instigate corporations and 
business lobbies to abandon a strategy of opposition and begin to support the implementation 
of new environmental regulation.  
First, regulatory formation raises perceptions of risk and uncertainty among liable 
industries. When faced with a high probability or perceived inevitability of regulation in the 
short to medium term, many corporations are likely to begin to support the regulatory process 
and start pushing to shape rules that enhance their strategic positioning. Perceived benefits of 
early support for new regulation include having a seat at the table to promote predictability, 
regulatory certainty and their organization’s and/or sector’s economic interests. Second, when 
established regulations and/or regimes are not uniform or harmonized across countries they 
create uneven playing fields for globally or regionally competitive industries. Those 
companies disproportionately disadvantaged by compliance costs unknown to competitors are 
under this scenario likely to abandon a strategy of opposition and begin to push for regulation 
that would level the playing field.  Third, regulatory uncertainties also create market 
opportunities. Early movers in the development of technological solutions may find their 
strategic positioning vis-à-vis competitors improved under a new regulatory scenario, which 
makes such regulation more acceptable and sometimes beneficial to them. Therefore, to reap 
benefits of new regulation, technological frontrunners may begin to pursue a strategy of 
regulatory entrepreneurship. In sum, under one or a combination of the above conditions—
including the growth of regulatory threats and uncertainties, emerging or de-facto uneven 
playing fields and the proliferation of market opportunities—the strategies of liable 
corporations and industries may shift from opposition to regulatory support and 
entrepreneurship.  
 The model identifies the threshold at which a critical mass of leading industries and 
business lobbies have changed their political strategy and begun to push for regulatory change 
as the manifestation of a “tipping point”. Tipping points mark the disruption of a previous 
trajectory or path and the beginning of a cumulative process of change. A tipping point in 
business strategies does not imply that all liable industries and business lobbies have become 
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regulatory entrepreneurs or favor regulation, but that a clearly identifiable and prevailing 
group of business lobbies—large enough to make a political difference—has begun to 
exercise support and push for regulatory change.  
  The rate of change may depend on the nature of existing triggers and conditions, such 
as the velocity and form of the embryonic environmental-governance structures, the 
endurance and sternness of current political and regulatory momentum, available exit 
strategies, or the cost and realistic timeframes for implementing technological mitigation 
options. One might also identify a certain psychological dynamic behind, and inherent to, the 
tipping-point process. As argued above, business strategies may shift in response to changing 
structural conditions, but such strategic change can also happen partly in response to the 
actions of others. While some corporations and lobbies are frontrunners, acting out of 
perceived self-interest vis-à-vis anticipated future regulatory scenarios, other more reluctant 
corporations are likely to gradually follow-suit due to the increasing sway of new 
interpretations of future regulatory scenarios and their associated costs and benefits, or due to 
an expected increase in the number of other business actors also changing strategies in 
response to changing structural conditions. As such, actors change in response to the de-facto 
or expected actions of others in order to secure their position within the anticipated 
competitive landscape.   
Furthermore, the framework notes that a tipping point in business strategies is also 
likely to spur the creation of ‘Baptists and bootleggers’ coalitions of civil society and business 
organizations, respectively. These groups will join forces to lobby more effectively for new 
regulation. Civil society is motivated by intrinsic and moral reasons, business by the chance to 
influence regulatory design, secure competitiveness, and profit.  
 Moreover, it is posited that a tipping point in business strategies can generate new 
political momentum and spur the emergence of a second tipping point in the regulatory 
process. When the preferences of dominant business lobbies ‘tip’ and these groups begin to 
push for the adoption of new regulation and/or legislation, it improves conditions for political 
bargaining and places constructive pressure on the rule-making process. In the case of global 
regulation, tipping points in business strategies may cause key states to strengthen their pro-
regulation position. Or, if a dominant share of their domestic industries has come out in 
support for global regulation, it may also cause a change in the position of laggard states. This 
can in-turn facilitate inter-state negotiations and prompt more successful regime formation 
over time.  At the national level, tipping points in business strategies are likely to place new 
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pro-change pressure on the regulatory process, which can create political momentum, change 
key legislators’ positions, and generate progress in attempts to adopt new legislation. 
 The tipping point framework is presented and applied in articles 2 and 3. In the second 
article, it is utilized in a study of business strategies in the international climate regime 
between 1992 and 2009. Through a detailed case analysis, it demonstrates how the model 
provides a valid account of change in business strategies and regime formation over time. 
While organized business opposition to GHG regulation through the regime persisted for over 
a decade, by 2002 prominent anti-regulation lobbies had dispersed and became increasingly 
replaced by more accommodative and supportive lobbies. Indeed, by 2008, major business 
groups had begun to push for the adoption of mandatory regulation under a global regime. 
The case also illustrates how the emergence of a tipping point in business strategies is related 
to increasing regulatory uncertainties, uneven playing fields and the steady growth of market 
opportunities. It also discusses the extent to which the 2009 Copenhagen outcome represents 
the initiation of a second tipping point in regulatory formation caused by changing business 
preferences (Vormedal, 2011:12-19).  
In article 3, the tipping point framework is presented and utilized to analyze the 
development of US climate politics between 1990 and 2010. Through a detailed case study, it 
is demonstrated that the model provides a plausible account of the failures and successes of 
federal climate action between 1990 and 2010. While business opposition blocked efforts to 
impose federal restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions for over 15 years, by 2007 a major 
lobby representing leading and previously antagonistic liable industries had begun to support 
and push for the adoption of federal legislation. It is demonstrated how growing regulatory 
threats and uncertainties, uneven playing fields and market opportunities constitute important 
conditions behind the emergence of a tipping point in business strategies. It is further argued 
that this shift has been a central driver behind recent efforts to negotiate federal climate 
legislation in the Capitol (Vormedal, forthcoming).  
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6. Main Contributions, Limitations and Ensuing Research 
Agenda 
 
  
This section positions this research in the literature. The aim is to establish the overall 
contribution of the dissertation, consider some of its main limitations and discuss some 
possible ways forward that build on the research conducted.  
 The first and central aim of this dissertation has been to develop a framework for 
analyzing business preference and strategy formation in environmental governance. As the 
literature review illustrates, the neo-Gramsican and neo-pluralist models together offers a rich 
description of how corporate strategies are constructed, but provide a rather static account of 
preferences formation. The tipping-point model, which focuses on the dynamics behind 
change and shifts in preferences and strategies over time, adds to our understanding of how 
business strategies are constructed and re-constructed in environmental governance.  
 More specifically, examining the differences and similarities between previous 
literature on business and environmental governance and the tipping-point framework renders 
a number of important insights. First, the tipping-point framework’s analysis of the interplay 
between strategy formation and environmental-governance structures lends support to the 
neo-Gramscian stipulation of how corporate preferences reflect, and are constructed in 
response to, broader structures of environmental governance.  Yet, it does not support notion 
of agency being structurally determined by hegemonic fields and historical blocks, nor the 
implicit assumption that business’ structural power to resist unwelcomed new regulation can 
be established a priori. Conversely, this work demonstrates that in many instances, 
environmental regulations are successfully negotiated and adopted despite business opposition 
to them. This dissertation, therefore, does not adhere to the view that environmental-
governance structures constitute hegemonic fields in which the interests of actors coalesce. 
Rather, it verifies Falkner’s neo-pluralist characterization of them as contested arenas in 
which actors and interests cooperate and compete to define outcomes.  
   Second, it is notable that while the tipping point framework identifies regulatory 
threats and uncertainties as a key driver of preference formation, this dynamic is not explicitly 
recognized by previous literatures. Falkner identifies uneven regulatory playing fields and the 
effect of regulation on technological innovation as drivers of business conflict, but does not  
discuss the effects of regulatory pressure overall. Levy and Newell, on the other hand, 
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recognize that businesses accommodate pressures resulting from the growth of environmental 
governance, but this account remains vague and lacks some notion of how existing or 
anticipated regulation creates threats and uncertainties that shape perceptions of interests. An 
important insight that can be drawn from the tipping-point model is thus the impact of 
regulatory pressures, which generate new risks and uncertainties, on the dynamics of 
corporate preference formation.   
Third, the neo-Gramsican and neo-pluralist models argue that a complete account of 
strategy formation must also account for the role of constructivist variables such as ideas and 
knowledge in shaping corporate preferences. While the tipping-point framework to a large 
extent constitutes a rationalist and interest-based theory that stresses the centrality of (shifting 
perceptions of) economic interests in corporate-preference formation, it also recognizes the 
role that constructivist factors may play in this process, albeit indirectly or secondarily. On the 
one hand, the values, ideas and beliefs of corporate leaders, and their organizational cultures, 
act as a filter through which economic interests are interpreted. Ideas and beliefs therefore 
play an indirect role in regulatory preference formation by shaping perceptions of economic 
interests and the conditions which underpin individual and collective expectations of future 
regulatory risks and opportunities. On the other hand, strategic change is not simply instigated 
by de-facto objective assessments of current regulatory costs and benefits, but may also be the 
result of following competitors who begin to predict the coming of new regulation and change 
their strategies accordingly. As such, the calculation of future costs and benefits is also 
influenced by the strategic choices and predictions of other business actors. An increase in the 
number of pro-change businesses can build momentum and induce further strategic change 
amongst more actors, including those previously reluctant, and over time lead to the 
emergence of a tipping point.   
The second major aim this dissertation has been to give an account of the dynamics 
behind, and conditions for, regulatory formation in environmental and climate-change 
governance. The literature review demonstrates that while established models provide helpful 
tools for analyzing regulatory formation, they too offer a rather static account of the 
conditions for change. On the one hand, regime theories provide an extensive list of 
conditions that may inhibit or enable successful institutional bargaining, but fail to examine 
the processes and factors that produce or eliminate these conditions. Drezner’s model goes 
further by examining the domestic origins of state preferences, such as economic interest and 
the adjustment capacity of liable business groups. But Drezner does not discuss the 
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construction of business interests and strategies in the first place, and therefore does not 
provide a complete picture of the dynamics that determine global regulatory outcomes. Mattli 
and Woods, for their part, rightly emphasize how new regulation is more likely to come about 
when resourceful, expert and well-organized interests groups such as business and industry 
lobbies use their political clout to push for regulatory change. They identify various categories 
of so-called corporate regulatory entrepreneurs, but the discussion lacks a notion of the 
drivers behind the emergence of such entrepreneurship. It is thus clear that neither of the 
models reviewed provide a satisfactory account of the dynamics of regulatory formation and 
change. The tipping-point model, which demonstrates how the interplay between strategy 
construction and embryonic environmental governance generates conditions for change over 
time, therefore, represents a novel contribution that enhances our understanding of dynamics 
behind regulatory formation in the environmental domain. Once again, this insight 
underscores the need to account for the role played by markets and market actors to obtain a 
complete understanding of the drivers behind regulatory formation.  
However, comparing the tipping-point framework to other models of regulatory 
formation also highlights its limitations.  To be sure, the attempt of this dissertation has not 
been to present a model that paints a complete picture for all the different factors and 
processes that play a role and influence outcomes in regulatory formation, but to analyze one 
important dimension: the dynamics for change created by the interplay between state and 
market actors and structures.  Placing this contribution within Mattli and Woods’s framework, 
it can be argued that the tipping-point model enhances our understanding of demand-side 
conditions for regulatory change by conceptualizing the conditions under which influential 
corporate entrepreneurs and pro-change groups are likely to arise.   
More specifically, it is essential to situate the tipping-point model within the literature 
in order to identify other important enabling or inhibiting factors and conditions for regulatory 
formation that may intersect with the tipping-point dynamic. The emergence of business 
support for new environmental regulation may be an important and sometimes imperative 
condition for successful adoption. But if other important conditions are not satisfied, or if 
particularly inhibiting conditions emerge in parallel, it may not be enough to instigate 
enduring regulatory change. Indeed, the impetus for progress created by tipping points in 
business strategies may be undermined by other inhibiting factors.  
As state-centric theories rightly point out, the lack of hegemonic leadership or the 
opposition from states that do not regard the regulatory agreement as fair or equitable can 
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hamper efforts of pro-change collations of state and non-state actors to implement global 
regulation. Following Drezner’s argument, some states may remain opposed to global 
regulation if the compliance and adjustment costs for industry are relatively higher than in 
other countries. Thus, even after the strategies of dominant, international business lobbies 
have tipped and a coalition of powerful governments support and push for the establishment 
of global regulation, some states may continue to oppose regulatory coordination if it places 
their domestic industries at a competitive disadvantage, or removes a current competitive 
advantage.  The case of international climate regulation, as discussed in the second article of 
this dissertation, illustrates this point. While the emergence of pro-regulation, international 
business lobbies representing European, Japanese and some US industries has provided an 
impetus for Western governments to push for the adoption a global post-Kyoto Protocol, 
emerging economies such as China and Brazil are reluctant to take on legal commitments due 
to competitiveness concerns and high adjustment costs for domestic industries.  
Furthermore, the effects of a tipping point in business strategies may also be inhibited 
by political backlashes, such as the rallying of anti-regulation forces, ambiguous public 
support for the proposed regulatory change and lack of consensus regarding the science and 
impact of the environmental problem at the national level. Following Falkner’s argument, 
conflict emerging between and within business lobbies can limit the power of corporate 
entrepreneurs to effectively push for regulatory change, which may counteract the positive 
momentum caused by the materialization of a tipping point. On the one hand, even after the 
strategies of a critical mass of businesses have tipped, a minority of corporations particularly 
resistant to change—for example due to their low technological adjustment capacity or 
competitive positioning—may block regulatory negotiations from moving forward. On the 
other hand, conflict within the same pro-change coalition may emerge over regulatory design 
and the distribution of regulatory burdens between different sectors and businesses, and in-so-
doing, limit the lobby’s ability to commit to concrete legislative proposals. The case of US 
climate politics, as presented in the third article of this dissertation, provides a clear 
illustration of these dynamics. During the process to get a cap-and-trade bill through the 
House and the Senate between 2008 and 2010, pro-change coalitions continuously fought 
against countervailing pressures from conservative and Republican grass-root movements and 
Congressmen who challenged the climate regulation agenda based on small-government, anti-
regulation values and/or as part of a strategic game for debunking the Democratic policy 
agenda.  Moreover, conflict within the pro-change business group USCAP—which lobbied 
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for the adoption of a federal cap-and-trade program—and between the USCAP and 
corporations reluctant to embrace GHG regulation, may also have limited the overall impact 
of the tipping point.  It took over 2 years for USCAP members to reach agreement on 
specifics and thus to advocate a detailed legislative proposal, and even after that, during 
negotiations for the Kerry-Liberman-Graham Bill in the Senate, conflict emerged between 
coal-based utilities and the oil and gas sector over regulatory design, in particular the 
distribution of free allowances. 
This political disaster highlights the fact that tipping points are vulnerable to setbacks, 
or what might be defined as negative feedback mechanisms. While this dissertation has 
focused on positive feedbacks that instigate progress in the regulatory process, more 
systematic research is needed to examine countervailing mechanisms and forces that may 
intersect negatively with the tipping point dynamic.  
To illustrate this point about vulnerability to setbacks, it is fruitful to distinguish 
between what might be defined as political and technological tipping points. The model 
developed here focuses on tipping points that are of a political nature. First, business 
strategies epitomize the change in perceptions of interests that translates into political 
strategies and action. Second, regulatory formation signifies increased momentum and action 
amongst actors with the powers to adopt and implement regulation. Because perceptions, 
interests and strategies for action are subject to a broad spectrum of influences, change cannot 
be conceptualized as permanent unless it is possible to establish a point of no return. While a 
political tipping point represents a necessary first step towards enduring regulatory change, 
the potential for the emergence or presence of a range of countervailing forces and dynamics 
in the regulatory process renders a political tipping point vulnerable to obstacles and setbacks. 
A technological tipping point, on the other hand, signifies the passing of a threshold at which 
old polluting technologies and production methods have become economically inefficient and 
replaced with new, commercially viable and environmentally friendly alternatives. 
Conversely, this shift in production and the structure of the economy may be conceptualized 
as the materialization of a point of no return.  
A fruitful way forward would thus be to systematically explore and conceptualize the 
intersections between positive and negative dynamics for political and regulatory change in 
the field of climate-change governance, and to consider conditions for moving from one 
tipping point to the next. If a tipping point in business strategies has materialized, what are the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for the emergence of a tipping point in the political 
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process, and in the next phase, for the materialization of enduring regulatory change? Finally, 
what is necessary to move from a regulatory to a technological tipping point?  
Another possible direction for future research would be to further develop the model 
for understanding the tipping point dynamic in the case of business strategies. Rather than 
focusing on the role of structural conditions, it would be interesting to explore to what extent 
strategic change in one actor is influenced by de-facto and anticipated change among other 
actors, and to model more precisely where thresholds are empirically situated.  This task 
could be accomplished by using the methodology of so-called agent-based modeling (ABM), 
which seeks to model the how interactions among adaptive agents influence one another in 
response to the influence they receive (e.g. Macy and Willer, 2002; Axelrod and Tesfatsion, 
2006; Axelrod, 2006). While it is common to use computer-based simulation to build the 
models and produce results (e.g. Gilber and Terna, 1999), one of the earliest and most elegant 
applications of ABM—Thomas Schelling’s (1969) modeling of neighborhood tipping—
illustrates for this purpose how it is also possible to use more simple, logical 
conceptualizations and mathematical models to establish conditions and thresholds 
numerically. Using this logic, we might approach the modeling of say tipping-point dynamics 
in the energy sector. A first step would be to construct categories that distinguish between, for 
example, energy producers of varied type, energy distributers, manufacturers, and several 
industries of varied type. In addition, one might also distinguish between corporations that are 
leaders, early adopters, and laggards. In turn, it would be necessary to identify empirically the 
corporations and lobbies representing each category, within a given geographical unit. The 
next step would be to build models that calculate and define numerically, under explicit sets 
of given structural conditions, the thresholds at which tipping is likely to occur as a result of 
inter-agent influences. The models could be based on conceptual questions seeking to 
establish tolerance levels to change within and between sectors and sub-sectors. For example; 
how many frontrunners amongst coal-based energy producers does it take for other i) 
constructive and ii) reluctant coal-based energy producers to change strategy? How many oil 
producers, with what attributes, would have to change strategy to make the most resistant 
laggards follow suit? How many leaders are needed amongst utilities to instigate the most 
resistant firms? Empirically revealing thresholds, critical limits, other behavioral dynamics 
with respect to business preference and regulatory formation, broken down for trends and 
nuance across sectors and issues, would no-doubt further elucidate the fundamental purpose 
of this dissertation: the unique and powerful role of business in the regulatory process.     
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This introductory chapter has provided a discussion, overview and analysis of this 
PhD dissertation research as it is presented in three scholarly journal articles. A major 
contribution of this dissertation has been the development of a conceptual framework centered 
on how the interplay between business-strategy formation and embryonic environmental 
governance can generate mechanisms that may trigger political momentum and regulatory 
change. It has been argued that while more systematic research is needed to examine 
countervailing mechanisms and forces that may intersect negatively with the tipping point 
dynamic, the demonstration of the significance of thresholds such as tipping points in 
triggering cascades of progress, provides a novel contribution to the field of climate-change 
and environmental governance. In the following these articles are presented in their complete 
form.  
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The Inºuence of Business and Industry
NGOs in the Negotiation of the Kyoto
Mechanisms: the Case of Carbon Capture
and Storage in the CDM
•
Irja Vormedal*
Introduction
This article examines the role and inºuence of business and industry NGOs
(BINGOs) in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).
The important role played by business in the climate negotiations is increas-
ingly recognized and well documented. However, previous research on corpo-
rate engagement in the regime has concluded that business efforts to inºuence
negotiations have been more prevalent and effective at the state level than at the
international level. Allegedly, business is “likely to prefer acting at the national
level where it enjoys well-charted and predictable channels of inºuence,”1 and
has enjoyed less success in lobbying delegates from other states, in particular
from developing countries. It is also assumed that international institutions are
relatively insulated from business pressures.2 This paper differs in emphasizing
the increasing importance of the international level to the analysis of business
activities and business’s efforts to inºuence regime developments. While some
global business groups such as the International Chamber of Commerce have
been around for decades, and the growing importance of transnational business
coordination has been noted elsewhere,3 the nature and impact of these activi-
ties in the context of the climate negotiations has been insufªciently explored.
This article gives an account of the landscape in which business and industry
NGOs are currently operating in the climate regime, and provides an illustration
of how they organize and conduct their lobbying at the international level. In
contrast to previous studies, the article demonstrates how BINGOs target and
* I would like to gratefully acknowledge the three anonymous reviewers for their very construc-
tive remarks on the ªrst draft of this article. I would also like to thank Arild Underdal, Benedicte
Bull and Steinar Andresen for useful comments and suggestions.
1. Levy and Egan 1998, 1.
2. Levy and Egan 1998, 15.
3. Levy and Egan 1998, 9,16; and Levy 2005, 96–97.
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collaborate with a multitude of state delegations and international institutions
in the attempt to achieve their objectives. It will be argued that emergent inter-
national networks and corporate technological power facilitate transnational
business lobbying.4
Despite the fact that business and industry NGOs employ comparable if
not similar strategies and tactics to those of environmental NGOs, there has
been scarce communication between NGO and business scholars.5 This paper
seeks to help bridge this divide by applying a methodology developed for ana-
lyzing NGO inºuence in international environmental negotiations6 to a study
of business inºuence in the climate negotiations. Various aspects of this meth-
odology are further developed and advanced, to enable its application to studies
of business inºuence in international negotiations.
The paper begins by giving an account of the main characteristics of the
BINGOs active in the regime, including their views on climate change mitiga-
tion, strategies and lobbying tactics. For comparison, the various business
groups are placed along a continuum from “gray” to “green,” measuring the de-
gree of environmental proªle and mandate. The framework for assessing and
analyzing BINGO inºuence is subsequently developed, discussed and applied
to a case study tracing BINGO efforts to inºuence the negotiation of carbon cap-
ture and storage (CCS) technologies as a mitigation option under the Kyoto
Protocol and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The case highlights
the various access channels and resources BINGOs may invoke during the nego-
tiation processes, and illustrates how their lobbying and advocacy activities are
played out. Furthermore, the paper seeks to establish the relative success of
BINGO efforts to inºuence the process and outcome of negotiations, and the
factors that enable them to play an inºuential role within the international cli-
mate regime.
Business and Industry NGOs in the Climate Regime
Together with scientists and environmental NGOs (ENGOs), business and
industry NGOs (BINGOs) are considered to be among the most long-stand-
ing and active observer constituencies participating in the climate regime.7 From
the early 1990s—when negotiations for an international convention were
launched—to the signing and ratiªcation of the Kyoto Protocol at the end of the
decade, business engagement and participation was dominated by the fossil-
fuel lobby, organized mainly through the Global Climate Coalition, an anti-
mitigation and regulation group representing US and some European oil, coal,
automobile and chemical companies. However, by the turn of the century, the
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4. Falkner 2005, 106.
5. One notable exception is Depledge’s examination of access channels for observer organizations
into the UNFCCC process. Depledge 2005.
6. Betsill and Corell 2001.
7. Depledge 2005, 214.
BINGO constituency had grown and diversiªed, including a much wider range
of organizations with highly diverging interests, mandates and strategies in the
regime.8 The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), which represents
companies of all sizes and sectors in over 130 countries worldwide, serves as the
chair of the constituency, in charge of coordinating business’s activities and in-
put to the negotiation processes. While BINGOs are by deªnition non-proªt
organizations, their members are for-proªt companies. Many of the active com-
panies are members of several BINGOs, each catering to different needs and ob-
jectives. While nearly all companies attain their accreditation through a BINGO,
some participate as integral parts of state delegations.
The emergence and growth of BINGOs in the climate negotiations may be
seen as a result of the UNFCCC Secretariat’s demand that all nonstate actor par-
ticipants be nonproªt organizations, and its desire to organize the participation
of observer organizations into different NGO constituencies. However, the ex-
pansion of the BINGO as a particular form of business organization also reºects
the attempt by corporations to increase their legitimacy as political actors in the
international arena.9 Through the collective action of BINGOs, companies can
communicate more effectively with policy-makers and advocate their views
with greater legitimacy and authority. BINGOs also open doors to political are-
nas that are closed to companies operating individually. In this way, BINGOs
serve the function of establishing and maintaining access channels to forums
and negotiations to which individual companies would not otherwise have
been invited, providing them directly or indirectly a “voice at the table.”10 For
the companies, collective organization also brings with it the advantages of cost
sharing and knowledge pooling, as well as the support of a qualiªed secretariat
responsible for monitoring and providing continuous input to political negoti-
ation processes.11
While nationally-based BINGOs also seek to protect their members’ do-
mestic interests, most of the BINGOs active in the regime are transnational or-
ganizations targeting political processes at the regional and international levels.
It is common for BINGO secretariats to liaise and cooperate with a range of na-
tional governments around the world. Such networks enable them to lobby a
multitude of delegations from both developed and developing countries on
particular issues under negotiation in the climate regime. BINGOs also main-
tain good working relations with key staff from the UNFCCC Secretariat and its
subsidiary working bodies, to enable input to negotiation processes.12
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8. For example, at the COP/MOP 2 the total number of registered BINGOs was 23, and the total
number of individual businesses, 400.
9. Interview with Luke Warren, IPIECA, London, 31 October 2006; interview with Lorenz Koch,
WBCSD, Geneva, 17 January 2007; interview with Edwin Alders, IETA, Geneva, 18 January
2007; and interview with Robert Stastny, ICC, Paris, 22 January 2007.
10. Interview with Koch 2007.
11. Interview with Koch 2007; and interview with Alders 2007. See also Hillman and Hitt 1999,
830–831.
12. Interview with Alders 2007; interview with Koch 2007; interview with Stastny 2007; and inter-
view with Warren 2006.
While most BINGOs are transnational organizations, participation and
membership is unevenly distributed geographically. Businesses from developed
countries and regions such as North America, Western Europe, Australia, Japan
and Korea dominate most BINGOs and the constituency at large, while busi-
nesses from developing and least developed countries (LDCs) are almost com-
pletely absent from the scene. According to a Kenyan member of the ICC, many
developing-country businesses still lack the enabling networks required to facil-
itate participation as well as established channels for providing input into
global conferences and negotiations. Most also lack sufªcient funds to support
participation, and the few that participate are not sufªciently conªdent to take
an active role in the ongoing discussions and formation of lobbying positions
within the BINGO constituency.13
The BINGOs constitute a rather diverse group of organizations represent-
ing members with different interests, mandates and strategies. Indeed, their
views on climate change mitigation policies and mandatory GHG regulation
range from strong opposition to support and pro-regulation lobbying. The fol-
lowing section gives an account of the characteristics of the different types of
BINGOs active in the negotiations, placing them along a continuum from gray
(low or no environmental proªle and mandate) to green (high environmental
proªle and mandate). (See Table 1.)
Gray BINGOs (the ªrst category) are typically characterized by their ex-
plicit opposition to climate change mitigation and mandatory GHG regulation.
The main mandate and strategy of these organizations has been to prevent the
adoption of binding targets and timetables by states, and thus to preserve fossil-
fuel-intensive industries’ right to emit unlimited amounts of greenhouse gases
(GHGs). Gray BINGOs are known for utilizing ªnancial inducements to com-
plement their lobbying tactics, such as ªnancial contributions to government
decision-makers, or paying expenses and/or leisure trips for members of delega-
tions.14 While ªnancial inducements may be more common at the national
level, it is notable that BINGOs generally do not perceive such tactics to be legit-
imate or appropriate in the context of UN negotiations.15
The best-known example of a gray BINGO is the Global Climate Coalition
(GCC). The efforts of the GCC to obstruct and delay the negotiations for the
Framework Convention and subsequently the Kyoto Protocol are widely recog-
nized and have been well documented elsewhere.16 However, with the signing
and ratiªcation of Kyoto, the GCC suffered declining support from industry,
and in the late 1990s several of its core members such as BP, Shell and General
Motors left the organization because they felt they could no longer be associ-
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13. Interview with Suresh Patel, Agrochemicals Manufacture Saroc Limited and ICC, Nairobi, 13
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14. See Levy and Egan 1998; and personal communication with two Australian delegates [anonym-
ity requested], Nairobi, 12 November, 14 November, and 17 November 2006.
15. Interview with Stastny 2007; interview with Koch 2007; and interview with Alders 2007.
16. See Levy and Egan 1998; 2003; Newell and Paterson 1998; Leggett 2001; Newell 2000; Levy and
Newell 2002; and Levy and Newell 2005.
ated with its aggressive anti-climate stance.17 After thirteen years in operation,
the GCC was ofªcially disbanded in 2002.18 More recent examples of gray
BINGOs include the Australian Industry Greenhouse Network (AIGH) and the
Australia Aluminum Council (AAC). These organizations, also referred to as the
“Greenhouse Maªa,” successfully sought to undermine Australia’s ratiªcation of
the Kyoto Protocol under John Howard’s Liberal government from 1996 to
2007,19 and maintained a close relationship with lead negotiators to ensure
continued opposition to any Kyoto-like framework.20 Yet, the 2007 change of
government and the subsequent ratiªcation of Kyoto by Prime Minister Rudd
marked the ultimate failure of these business groups to block Australia’s adop-
tion of binding targets.
Indeed, by the turn of the century, gray and reactionary BINGOs had
almost disappeared from the scene, which reºects a more general shift in corp-
orate strategies in Europe and North America from opposition to accom-
modation and cooperation.21 Many of the formerly reactionary industries now
organize through BINGOs that can be placed at the gray middle (the second cat-
egory). These organizations no longer oppose regulations per se, but seek to
inºuence regulatory design and the adoption of favorable mitigation technolo-
gies and methodologies by Kyoto Parties. Middle-gray BINGOs include both
sector-speciªc and cross-sectoral interest associations such as the World Nuclear
Association (WNA), the World Coal Institute (WCI), the International Petro-
leum Industry Energy Conservation Association (IPIECA) and the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC). The mandates and strategies of sector-speciªc
BINGOs are usually to promote solutions that enable these sectors to survive, or
to maintain or capture new markets in a carbon-constrained economy. Some in-
creasingly aspire to a greener proªle, by placing more emphasis on developing
low-emission technologies such as carbon capture and storage (CCS) and clean
coal technologies or, as in the case of the WNA, marketing nuclear power as a
sustainable and clean energy option. The ICC, despite being a large, cross-
sectoral business organization, has in reality been dominated by the US oil gi-
ant ExxonMobil, a company infamous for its aggressive anti-climate stance. This
has prohibited the ICC Council on Environment and Energy from moving fur-
ther towards a pro-regulation stance.22
BINGOs situated at the green middle of the continuum (the third cate-
gory) have an explicitly greener or pro-regulation proªle. One of the most
prominent BINGOs in this category is the International Emissions Trading As-
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17. Skjærseth and Skodvin 2004, 167.
18. Sourcewatch 2006.
19. Interview with Dr. Guy Pearse, speechwriter for the Australian Environment Minister 1997–
2000, shown in the documentary “The Greenhouse Maªa” by Four Corners 2006. Transcript
available at http://www.abc.net.au/4corners/content/2006/s1568867.htm.
20. Personal conversations with two Australian delegates [anonymity requested], Nairobi, 12 No-
vember, 14 November, and 17 November 2006.
21. Levy 2005.
22. Personal communication with sources at the ICC [anonymity requested].
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sociation (IETA). From its establishment in 1999, the organization has grown to
become by far the largest and most active BINGO in the regime.23 The main ob-
jectives of IETA are to advocate the use of market mechanisms as climate policy
instruments, to promote effective and functional systems for trading in GHG
emissions, and to help ensure the effective functioning of the Kyoto ºexibility
mechanisms.24 IETA consists of a diverse group of corporations, including emit-
ters, traders and veriªers. What unites these different sectors is a common inter-
est in promoting well-functioning market mechanisms and regulatory designs.
Another prominent BINGO with a greener proªle is the World Business Council
for Sustainable Development (WBCSD). The WBCSD explicitly endorses the
need for GHG regulation and international frameworks, and presents itself as a
constructive partner in the effort to ªnd solutions that can help mitigate climate
change. In general, the WBCSD focuses on long-term policy advocacy by dis-
seminating papers and through direct collaboration with decision-makers and
the UNFCCC secretariat.25 While WBCSD members come from a range of sec-
tors with different interests and carbon liabilities, what unites these diverse
industries behind a pro-mitigation agenda is the view that a failure to take
action—that is, to prepare for a future regulatory environment in which GHGs
carry a high price—imposes a great risk to their long-term competitiveness and
market survival.26 As the WBCSD secretariat puts it,
If you are a smart CEO these days you will realize that climate change issues
will have a big impact on your future business. So you might as well get in-
volved right from the beginning. A lot of companies that are around today
will not be around in 50 years, because they didn’t manage to respond to a
different economic environment which will be shaped by sustainable devel-
opment issues.27
However, because many of the WBCSD members still have a high carbon liabil-
ity and operate in highly competitive global sectors, the organization’s lobbying
and advocacy has focused more on creating level playing ªelds, i.e. including all
major emitters in a global framework, than on supporting a more stringent
Kyoto-like framework post-2012. It has also tended to lend vague regulatory
support rather than promoting stringent, quantiªed targets for a future deal,
and focused on promoting fossil-fuel-friendly mitigation technologies and nu-
clear power.28
Finally, green BINGOs (the fourth category) may be characterized by an
unambiguous pro-mitigation and regulation agenda. These are typically organi-
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23. At the COP/MOP 2, IETA registered over 130 participants, amounting to nearly one-third of the
BINGO constituency.
24. IETA 2006; and interview with Alders 2007.
25. Interview with Koch 2007; see also Timberlake 2006.
26. Interview with Koch 2007; interview with M. Xerri, Areva and WBCSD, Paris, 1 February 2007;
interview with Mette Vågnes-Eriksen, Statskraft and WBCSD, Oslo, 26 March 2007; interview
with Jacque Toraille, Michelin and WBCSD, Paris, 5 February 2007; and interview with Elin
Myrmel-Johansen, Storebrand and WBCSD, Oslo, 13 March 2007.
27. Interview with Koch 2007.
28. Statement by Björn Stigson at the Bali Business Day, 10 December 2007.
zations representing businesses that would beneªt commercially from climate
policies and more stringent regulation of GHGs, and which therefore lobby par-
ties to take on more rigorous, binding commitments to reduce their emissions.
Renewable energy industries, for example, have experienced signiªcant growth
with the proliferation of GHG regulations in recent years, including national
and regional policies and subsidies for clean energy,29 and thus promote GHG
regulation that will further incentivize and accelerate investment into energy
efªciency and renewable energy technologies and companies.30 The most prom-
inent organization representing such industries has been the Business Council
for Sustainable Energy (BCSE). More recently, however, actors from the ªnancial
services sector have joined the renewable energy lobby. As the volume of carbon
trading has increased with the coming into force of GHG regulations, this sector
has seized opportunities to develop new ªnancial and insurance instruments,
products and advisory services that facilitate trade and investment in emissions
reduction projects. As such, many in the ªnancial industries would beneªt from
more stringent regulations, which would increase trading and boost demand for
their services. Similarly, with the growth of clean-tech ventures, an increasing
number of investors could also proªt from tighter caps on GHGs.31
BINGOs situated at the middle gray to the green end of the continuum
usually employ tactics that correspond to Alpin and Hegarty’s notion of infor-
mation-based political strategies,32 deªned here as information-based lobbying.
Information-based lobbying may involve providing governments with expert
advice, technical reports and position papers, and assisting decision-makers di-
rectly with policy formulation and the writing of legal texts.33 The aim of infor-
mation-based lobbying is to make industry preferences known to decision-
makers, or to estimate and elucidate the costs and beneªts for the market in
relation to speciªc issue outcomes or regulatory designs.34 Using networks es-
tablished with key decision-makers in governments and international institu-
tions to disseminate policy-relevant information and recommendations is con-
sidered to be the most effective means by which to provide input to the political
process.35 Some BINGOs however, in particular the WBCSD, also utilize what
may be termed discursive tactics. This implies the strategic use of information,
ideas and political discourse to construct broad policy arguments, frame de-
bates and get issues on the agenda. Such strategies are thus comparable to those
often employed by environmental NGOs.36
Clearly, not all BINGOs can be placed in any one category. The intention
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30. BCSE 2006; and interview with Lisa Jacobsen, US Business Council for Sustainable Energy, Bali,
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Bali, 11 December 2007.
32. Alpin and Hegarty 1980.
33. Hillman and Hitt 1999, 834.
34. Alpin and Hegarty 1980.
35. Interview with Alders 2007; interview with Koch 2007; and interview with Stastny 2007.
36. See e.g., Keck and Sikkink 1998; Khagran et al. 2002; and Princen and Finger 1994.
of drawing up a continuum from gray to green is not to place each organization
at a ªxed point, but rather to provide the reader with a brief overview of the
main business approaches to GHG regulation and the relationship among the
different interests, mandates and strategies employed.
A Framework for Analyzing BINGO Inºuence in the Climate
Negotiations
The framework for assessing BINGO inºuence draws on a methodology devel-
oped by Michele Betsill and Elisabeth Corell for analyzing NGO inºuence in in-
ternational environmental negotiations.37 Building on this framework facilitates
a comparison of the impact of ENGO and BINGO activities and strategies in ne-
gotiations.
Following Knoke,38 Betsill and Corell deªne inºuence as the process of
one actor (A) intentionally transmitting information to another actor (B),
which alters what B would do lacking such information.39 However, while
rightly deªning a causal relationship between the behavior of actors A and B,
this conceptualization fails to deªne the type of behavior being caused. The
deªnition appears to imply that any response by B to the activities of A can be
read as an indication of inºuence. A more precise deªnition should recognize
that inºuence is also contingent upon the response of actor B reºecting the in-
tentions of actor A. Therefore, inºuence is deªned here as the activities of actor
A bringing about intended effects in the behavior of actor B.
This deªnition can be interpreted as being related to a behavioral and rela-
tional notion of power: A having the power to get B to do something that B
would not otherwise do.40 While power and inºuence are intimately linked con-
cepts, it is possible to distinguish between them. For example, inºuence can be
deªned as a relationship resulting in a modiªcation of one actor’s behavior by
that of another, whereas power refers to capability, that is, the spectrum of re-
sources available to actors.41 In both instances however, this approach conceives
of power and inºuence as inherently behavioral and relational concepts—as
things traceable to the actors’ behavior—which is contingent upon the mainte-
nance of access and communication channels among them.42
Inºuence can be understood as a two-dimensional concept: While it is in-
stigated by (i) the transmission of information (advocacy and lobbying) by one
actor, it is also contingent upon causing intended effects in (ii) the behavior of
other actors.43 To gather evidence on the ªrst dimension, one might look for in-
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41. Cox and Jacobson 1973, 3.
42. Knoke 1990, 3.
43. Betsill and Corell 2001, 72.
formation regarding how actors attempt to exercise inºuence in negotiations.
The following indicators are used to collect data for the ªrst dimension:
1. Access: opportunities to participate and intervene in formal negotiating
arenas, and access to national delegations (ratifying parties);
2. Resources: material resources (ªnancial assets) or non-material resources
(information and knowledge); and
3. Activities: interventions in negotiating sessions, working directly with ne-
gotiators on issues, various forms of lobbying, providing expert advice,
disseminating knowledge, campaigning, and protests.
However, while access, activities and resources may be preconditions to inºu-
ence, they do not automatically translate into inºuence. Rather, inºuence is de-
pendent on the behavior of other actors (the second dimension) and whether
the business groups’ activities are successful in terms of fulªlling the goal(s) set
for them. Following Keck and Sikkink,44 this study seeks to identify “goal attain-
ment” at different levels, that is, to assess whether political outcomes reºect the
objectives of BINGOs. One might look for goal attainment both in relation to
the process of negotiations—for example, by investigating whether negotiators
discussed issues proposed by BINGOs—and in relation to the ªnal outcome—by
investigating whether ªnal agreements reºect BINGO goals and principles, or
contain text drafted by BINGOs. Thus it is possible to distinguish between proce-
dural inºuence and inºuence over negotiation outcomes. However, while the con-
cept of goal attainment may be used to indicate inºuence, it is potentially lim-
ited in terms of mapping patterns of causality. Indeed, one easily runs the risk of
confusing correlation with causation. For example, some states may choose to
adopt positions and policies that correspond to those of business lobbies, but
for other reasons. Thus, after having established goal attainment, it is necessary
to look for further evidence concerning what factors may have inºuenced states’
positions and policies.
Process tracing is a technique often used to demonstrate causation. Zürn
deªnes it as endeavoring to “assess causality by recording each element of the
causal chain.”45 In this context, process tracing thus requires building a logical
sequence of evidence linking BINGO lobbying and advocacy to process devel-
opment, the behavior of delegations and decision outcomes. In other words,
the observable activities of the “inºuencer”46 must be spelled out, and the extent
to which these activities affected the reasoning and behavior of “inºuencees”
must be assessed.47
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This article also distinguishes between two levels of goal attainment.
BINGO activities (advocacy and lobbying) can cause intended effects in both
1. The general position of a delegation on a given issue, and/or
2. The ªne print and details of negotiation processes and decisions/regula-
tions, e.g., the speciªc formulation of legal text and design of regulatory
mechanisms.
Assessing and analyzing the second dimension of inºuence also warrants a clar-
iªcation of the characteristics of potential “inºuencees” (states). One might dis-
cern three major groups of “inºuencees.” The ªrst group consists of those dele-
gations whose interests and positions on the issue in question correlate with the
relevant business group(s). The correspondence between the interests of the
“inºuencer” and the “inºuencees” makes it rather meaningless to talk about
goal attainment or inºuence in relation to the ªrst level identiªed above, the
general position on a given issue. However, there is still a potential for business
groups to inºuence delegations’ work on the ªne print or details of decisions
(second level). The second category of “inºuencees” consists of national delega-
tions whose interests and positions on the issue in question clearly conºict with
those of BINGO(s). Inºuencing the positions of these delegations (ªrst level) is,
due to their fundamentally differing views, likely to prove particularly difªcult,
if not impossible. Finally, the third group of “inºuencees” consists of national
delegations whose interests and views in relation to the issue in question are un-
certain, unstable or undecided. Often, delegates have insufªcient knowledge
and expertise related to an issue under negotiation and may in those cases look
to other parties or nonstate actors, including business, for information and ar-
guments necessary to develop their positions. These delegations are likely to be
more susceptible to pressure, which renders them an important target for
BINGOs in their attempt to inºuence both the issue position (the ªrst level)
and input on the details (the second level) of a decision. Thus, the three groups
of “inºuencees” each represents a different strategic challenge, both in terms of
how prone they are to BINGO advocacy and lobbying, and in terms of the level
at which inºuence may be exercised.
The adoption of a framework grounded in relational and behavioral con-
ceptions of power for assessing inºuence suffers several shortcomings. While
the scope and impact of concrete lobbying and advocacy efforts by business
groups can be assessed and analyzed within a relational approach, it may fail to
capture more indirect, tacit and structural forms of inºuence and power. Indeed,
the inºuences of business lobbies are often subtle rather than transparently visi-
ble. Governments may anticipate industry opposition to legislation that would
harm their activities, which may result in the legislation’s being deemed unde-
sirable.48 Business is often implicitly inºuential by virtue of its positional power,
46 • The Inºuence of Business and Industry NGOs
48. Newell and Paterson 1998, 687.
owing to its mere size, economic power and ubiquity.49 Furthermore, the inti-
mate link between state interests and capital accumulation in modern capitalist
societies, with the state depending on economic growth to maintain legitimacy,
implies that “those who organize the process (capital) gain great structural
power with regard to state decision making.”50 Given the centrality of fossil-fuel-
based energy in twentieth-century economic growth, the regulation of GHG
emissions fundamentally challenges the premises of modern industrial devel-
opment. Thus the reluctance of many states to commit to binding regulations
cannot be explained without reference to the structural power of the companies
involved in the production of fossil-fuel energy, and to the state-industrial
nexus.51 These types of indirect, tacit and structural forms of power cannot be
captured by relational and behavioral approaches to studying business inºu-
ence.
A relational approach also ignores the important relationship between
power and knowledge. Indeed, power is more than something that is possessed
and exercised by certain actors; it also is manifest in knowledge structures such
as speciªc methods or techniques that shape, direct, constrain and modify so-
cial interaction and behavior.52 In these terms, inºuence may be derived from
the power to develop and control various forms of knowledge and techniques.
Falkner’s notion of corporate technological power highlights “the critical role
that corporate actors play in shaping the knowledge framework of international
environmental policymaking” by having the power to innovate, develop, diffuse
and implement new technologies that help regime implementation.53
Notwithstanding the good reasons that a study of business inºuence in
the climate negotiations should be guided by a structural analysis, this paper
adopts a relational approach to gathering data on business inºuence. While the
structural argument has been developed elsewhere, the major aim of this article
is to trace, illustrate and analyze a concrete process of business lobbying and ad-
vocacy at the international level. Certainly, this endeavor can hardly highlight
all the ways in which business actors are powerful and exert inºuence in global
environmental regimes. It can, however, add one piece to our understanding of
the various ways that business exercises political inºuence, by illustrating how
business organizes itself in the climate regime and by tracing the process in
which it attempts to inºuence the ongoing negotiations.
While a relational approach can shed light on how business groups (en-
deavor to) exert inºuence, the focus on behavioral mechanisms does less to ex-
plain it. Rather than approaching an explanation from a structural perspective,
this paper applies Falkner’s concept of corporate technological power in analyz-
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ing the sources of business inºuence in the negotiations. This approach pro-
ceeds from the assumption that BINGOs contribute to the development of the
regulatory discourse by virtue of their capacity to innovate, develop and imple-
ment climate mitigation technologies.
Understanding how domestic factors inºuence the politics and behavior
of national delegations is crucial to the analysis of international politics. The de-
pendence of governments on particular economic activities and industries,
combined with the multitude of well-established access channels to politicians
and decision-makers, provides business lobbies with a particular leverage to
inºuence government policy at the domestic level.54 Governments often formu-
late their positions and policies prior to the commencement of a COP/MOP.55
Indeed, some BINGOs view efforts of the international BINGOs to inºuence
delegations during negotiations as redundant, emphasizing instead the sway of
national interest associations.56 A complete analysis of business inºuence in the
climate negotiations should therefore warrant a systematic assessment of the
inºuence of industry groups at the national level. However, it is unfortunately
beyond the scope of this study to explore both international- and domestic-
level variables. Therefore, a choice was made to focus on the former because the
aim of this paper is to illustrate one speciªc dimension of business inºuence,
namely the international or transnational dimension. Indeed, most of the lead-
ing BINGOs such as the ICC, WBCSD, IPIECA and IETA emphasize the impor-
tance of this dimension to their work.57 While studies of business power in in-
ternational climate politics commonly focus on how business efforts at the
national level have fed into the international process, studies of the transna-
tional organization of business activities at the international level are less com-
mon. This study thus attempts to broaden our understanding of the nature and
impact at the international level of business activities, which have been increasing
since the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol,58 notwithstanding arguments that the
analysis ideally should be controlled for domestic-level variables.
The strategy for gathering data on the role and inºuence of BINGOs uti-
lizes the so-called method of triangulation, i.e., the use of multiple data types
and sources.59 First, documentary analysis was conducted of relevant primary
and secondary sources such as draft negotiation texts, country statements, lob-
bying material, ªnal agreement texts, the Earth Negotiations Bulletin, the NGO
newsletter ECO, press releases and media reports. Second, interviews and per-
48 • The Inºuence of Business and Industry NGOs
54. See, for example, Levy and Egan 1998.
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sonal conversations60 were conducted with BINGO staff and BINGO member
corporations prior to, during and after negotiations. Some ENGOs and national
delegates were also interviewed and consulted. Finally, much of the data gather-
ing was enabled by direct observation by the researcher. Receiving formal ac-
creditation by the International Chamber of Commerce enabled me to attend a
wide range of closed BINGO meetings and to follow their activities intimately.
This facilitated a large number of conversations with BINGO members, which
proved essential to the process.
Indicating BINGO Inºuence: Access, Resources and Activities
Access: BINGOs enjoy considerable access to negotiating forums. All accred-
ited nonstate actors are admitted to plenary sessions and contact groups.61 How-
ever, informal consultations, which are usually set up for the ªnal stages of bar-
gaining, are closed to observer organizations. BINGOs frequently “intervene”
during negotiating sessions, that is, deliver formal position statements to dele-
gates on particular agenda items. They also have both formal and informal ac-
cess to the UNFCCC Secretariat. Closed consultative meetings between the
BINGO constituency, the COP President, the Workshop Chairs and the Execu-
tive Secretary are arranged by the Secretariat throughout negotiations. These for-
mal intervention opportunities and access channels are established for all the
nonstate actor constituencies participating in the regime. The Secretariat ap-
pears to consider business access and input crucial to its work. According to the
Executive Secretary and the COP President, the Secretariat has always “consid-
ered the views of business to be very important to the political processes,”62 and
asserts that business “engagement in the process and with policy-makers makes
a positive contribution.”63 BINGOs also have formal and informal access to a
multitude of national delegations. Informal network and social ties are invoked
both during and outside of negotiations to make heard business preferences on
particular policy and regulatory options.
Resources: Intellectual capital, in the form of technical knowledge and exper-
tise, technological proªciency and innovation capacity, no doubt represents one
of the most important and empowering resources of the BINGOs. Indeed, de
facto ownership of speciªc mitigation technologies and methodologies and the
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ability of BINGOs and their members to calculate costs and beneªts for the
market in relation to particular regulatory options and implementation out-
comes provide them with signiªcant leverage in the negotiations.64 Further-
more, ªnancial assets represent an important resource. While BINGOs tend not
to provide direct ªnancial contributions to delegates, ªnancial assets enable
BINGOs to arrange fully catered side events, cocktail receptions, dinners and
other social events during negotiations. These events are important networking
arenas. BINGOs also beneªt from considerable administrative resources, which
help the companies navigate within the chaotic environment of the negotia-
tions.
Activities: Numerous activities are usually undertaken at a COP/MOP. While
some are coordinated and agreed upon by the constituency as a whole, others
are performed by individual organizations alone or in coalition with other
BINGOs. BINGOs hold daily meetings for the constituency members, intervene
in the formal negotiating sessions,65 arrange seminars and side events, and set
up stands. Side events, such as seminars, presentations and panel discussions,
are seen as an important way to raise critical debate and to explore issues that
are not considered in the formal negotiations.66 Stands provide interested par-
ties with material such as reports and policy statements. BINGOs also host cock-
tail receptions and dinners for participants, which serve as informal meeting
points for BINGO staff, companies, NGOs, national delegates and the secretar-
iat.67 Furthermore, BINGOs arrange private meetings with the secretariat staff
and national delegations, distribute lobby documents and position papers, and
assist delegates in the formulation and writing of legal texts in the ªnal stages of
negotiations. Indeed, BINGOs tend to approach any national delegation if they
consider it helpful to promoting a particular goal.68 For example, IETA has
established a far-reaching network of working relationships with delegations
worldwide. Communication and cooperation between business and state dele-
gates during negotiations are dependent on who is involved in a particular ne-
gotiation, rather than contingent upon national ties. Moreover, BINGOs are
also approached by delegates asking for input. According to IETA, the organiza-
tion is generally involved in the drafting of legal texts in at least one or two con-
tact groups at each COP. This implies that IETA staff and some of their members
who are experts on the issue at stake sit down with the designated delegates to
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work out viable text options for a particular decision. As the IETA Secretariat put
it, “We sometimes get very clear questions: what is it that you want and how can
we achieve that?”69
Tracing a Process of BINGO Inºuence: The Case of Carbon Capture
and Storage in the Clean Development Mechanism
This section illustrates how BINGOs seek to inºuence negotiations at the inter-
national level, by looking speciªcally at the issue of including (geological)
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technologies as a mitigation option in the
regime, through an approval of CCS as project activity under the Clean Devel-
opment Mechanism (CDM).70 CCS is “a process consisting of the separation of
CO2 from industrial and energy-related sources, transport to a storage location
and long-term isolation from the atmosphere.”71 Stable geological formations
such as hydrocarbon ªelds and aquifers are currently considered the most viable
locations for storage.72 According to the International Energy Agency, CCS could
provide for up to 55 percent of the emissions reductions necessary to stabilize
global warming by 2050; if the right action is taken to increase investment and
development of the technology, CCS could become an essential technology in
the transition to a sustainable energy system during the next 50 to 100 years.73
Several issues related to safety and environmental risk may need further re-
search and assessment, particularly regarding leakage of CO2 from storage sites.
Nevertheless, with appropriate site selection, monitoring programs, regulatory
systems and methods to stop or control CO2 leakage, it is very likely that 99 per-
cent of stored CO2 can be retained in geological reservoirs over a period of 1000
years.74
Although the concept of CCS has only recently been introduced in the
UNFCCC, it is increasingly recognized as one of the main future GHG mitiga-
tion options available. However, while the Kyoto Protocol indirectly recognizes
CCS under article 2.1 (a) (iv) by its reference to carbon sequestration technolo-
gies, there is no explicit mention of CCS in the Convention or the Protocol.
The fact that CCS offers the opportunity to continue using fossil fuels
without signiªcant CO2 emissions makes it an attractive solution for the oil, gas
and coal sectors. Indeed, several fossil-fuel-producing industries and govern-
ments have already devoted considerable resources to the development and de-
ployment of CCS.75 CCS technologies originate from the oil and gas industry,
including companies such as ChevronTexaco, Shell and ExxonMobil, which ªrst
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developed CCS for the purpose of enhanced oil recovery (EOR). Statoil’s “Sleip-
ner Project” in the North Sea, which captures and stores CO2 in underground
geological formations, was the ªrst CCS project initiated for the purpose of re-
ducing GHGs, an innovation put in practice in response to the introduction of
the Norwegian CO2 tax in the early 1990s.76 Statoil, in partnership with the Nor-
wegian government, has also commenced building the world’s largest gas-
powered electricity generation facility (Mongstad) with CCS, scheduled to be
completely operational by 2014. The coal industry, for their part, also view CCS
as one of the major technological solutions that will enable coal to meet its en-
vironmental challenges, and are currently making considerable investment in
research and development of CCS for coal-ªred power generation facilities.77 It
is clear that the survival of fossil fuels as a major energy source in a carbon-
constrained world is contingent upon CCS technologies’ being successfully de-
veloped and approved. Thus, companies and BINGOs representing the fossil-
fuel sectors have a vested interest in seeing CCS recognized as a mitigation op-
tion within the climate regime.
According to business, the widespread deployment of CCS is currently un-
economical, and policy and regulatory frameworks are required in the near term
to provide ªnancial incentives to stimulate investment if CCS is to contribute to
global GHG emissions reductions. Because of its current uncertain status in the
international regime, there have been few incentives for companies to invest in
the research and development of geological CCS.78 Therefore, business views the
inclusion of CCS in the CDM as an important way to provide incentives for in-
vestments in further development and commercialization of the technology.79
Business groups also believe there to be few negative impacts of deploying CCS
on a full scale, and that with appropriate site selection and the development
and utilization of appropriate monitoring systems, CCS can be conducted safely
and with environmental integrity.80 The ENGOs and the Climate Action Net-
work (CAN), on the other hand, argue that accepting CCS within the Kyoto
framework is problematic because it may divert and delay a long-wanted shift
from the use of fossil fuels to renewables.81 CAN also considers CCS an unviable
option under the CDM because no regulatory framework is currently in place to
address the monitoring and veriªcation of emissions reductions, and to ensure
that CO2 will be safely stored. If CCS were to be included in the CDM, it could
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divert investments from renewables, energy efªciency and small-scale projects
that have direct beneªts for local communities.82 There is also disagreement be-
tween major groups of national governments on whether CCS represents a via-
ble climate-change mitigation option. Some parties, most notably major oil and
gas producing countries such as Norway and the OPEC countries, but also Japan
and the European Union (EU), have expressed support for including CCS as a
CDM project activity. Others parties, including Brazil and several other Latin
American countries, do not recognize this option. The opposition argues that
CCS technologies are being pushed too fast in view of the many uncertainties,
their limited geographical application and the risk that an increase in CCS proj-
ect activities would divert investments from renewables.83
The fact that CCS as a mitigation option might provide signiªcant emis-
sions reductions by 2050, if recognized in the regime and implemented on a
full-scale basis, makes it an interesting case for study. The currently unresolved
status of this technology and the disagreement between business, environmen-
tal NGOs and national governments also provide fertile ground for analyzing
inºuence and power. The following section gives an account of key events as
well as major BINGO and ENGO activities that led up to the adoption of deci-
sion FCCC/KP/CMP/2006/L.8 at the COP 12/MOP 2 in Nairobi (2006) and de-
cision FCCC/SBSTA/2007/L.19 at COP 13/CMP 3 in Bali (2007) regarding CCS
in CDM.84 The aim of this section is to demonstrate how the efforts to inºuence
the negotiation process transpired.
Prior to the Nairobi conference, IETA and IPIECA wrote to the EU Presi-
dency and UNFCCC Secretariat,85 urging them to promote the approval of CCS
as a CDM project activity at the COP 12/MOP 2.86 IPIECA and IETA also held
two side events on CCS as a mitigation option at the beginning of the Nairobi
meeting, which were widely attended by government delegates. When delegates
formally discussed the issue, ªrst during a plenary session and later during a
contact group, the IETA President made two interventions arguing for the inclu-
sion of CCS in the CDM. A group of experts on CCS from the BINGO constitu-
ency also wrote a position paper entitled “Ad-Hoc Expert Group Statement on
Carbon Capture and Geological Storage (CCS) in the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM),” which was widely distributed at the conference. The state-
ment recommended that “a working group be set up under the UNFCCC pro-
cess . . . to enhance capacity building on CCS . . . and to enable CCS within the
CDM by COP/MOP 3 [2007],” argued that that the COP/MOP 2 decision must
not impede the development of CCS, and recommended that Parties support
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capacity building and deployment of the technology to avoid increases in emis-
sions. Twelve industry representatives signed the statement, including IPIECA,
IETA, and the ICC. Throughout the two weeks of negotiations, IETA and IPIECA
also lobbied several delegations directly, including the EU, Norway, the Latin
American delegations and some African delegations.87 The EU and Norway as-
sured them that they would promote CCS as CDM methodology in the infor-
mal consultations, and encouraged the BINGOs to approach other delegates to
demonstrate—based on industry experience—that carbon can be safely stored
and monitored in the long term, and that a rejection of CCS would affect tech-
nological development negatively.88 BINGO efforts to persuade the Latin Ameri-
cans, however, were unsuccessful. Apparently, these delegations had brokered a
deal with Brazil to oppose CCS in the CDM prior to the negotiations. Brazil’s
ªrm opposition was known to the BINGOs from previous unsuccessful at-
tempts to lobby for a change in their position.89 However, lobbying the African
delegations proved relatively successful. When the issue was ªrst raised in the
plenary, several African delegations spoke out against CCS in the CDM, and ex-
pressed concern over the inequitable geographical distribution and high costs
of CDM projects. In the contact groups, however, the African countries refrained
from opposing approval of CCS, which indicated a shift in their position.90 In-
deed, between the plenary session and the contact groups, IETA and IPIECA met
with these delegations to try to convince them of the positive effects of approv-
ing CCS for Africa, which could receive increased private-sector investments in
project activities through the CDM. The appearance of a leading Batswana
delegate91 in the panel of an IETA side-event on CCS at the end of the Nairobi
meeting—supporting CCS in the CDM and arguing that the approval of the
technology would beneªt industrial development and climate mitigation in
Africa—also indicates a change in position.
Meanwhile, the ENGOs did their share of lobbying against CCS in the
CDM in Nairobi. The Climate Action Network (CAN) on behalf of the ENGOs
intervened in the plenary meeting and the contact group, and met with a num-
ber of delegations, including the EU, Norway, AOSIS and some developing
countries. While AOSIS and some of the Latin American delegations supported
the ENGOs, their efforts to challenge the EU position were unsuccessful.92 CAN
also challenged the Norwegians on several occasions. This resulted in a retort
from the head of delegation: “We cannot defend anyone who attempts, simply
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by principle, to exclude one of the most promising technologies for emissions
reductions from a mechanism like the CDM [. . .] Norway is a frontrunner in
this technology and the current government intends to continue to push for rec-
ognition of it. Including it in the CDM represents a way to create incentives for
CCS.”93 CAN’s “fossil of the day” prize, which is granted to the main “laggards”
during negotiations, was on several occasions given to delegations supporting
CCS in the CDM. The ENGO newsletter ECO, which is widely read by all partici-
pants in the negotiations, also took several swipes at CCS supporters in their ad-
vocacy articles.94
The Nairobi decision on CCS in the CDM95 did not make a ªnal ruling.
While it requested the CDM Executive Board to continue to consider CCS pro-
jects, it did not yet allow the Board to approve them. Instead, intergovernmental
organizations, NGOs and parties were asked to submit more information ad-
dressing technical issues to the UNFCCC Secretariat, to provide a basis for the
Subsidiary Body for Scientiªc and Technological Advice (SBSTA) to make an as-
sessment and recommendation to the Kyoto Parties. The decision scheduled a
reconsideration of the issue at the Bali meeting in 2007, with a view to reaching
a ªnal agreement at the Poznan conference in 2008. While it did not prohibit
CCS, the decision to request that the CDM Executive Board continue to consider
CCS projects meant that ªnal approval of CCS methodologies can only occur af-
ter further guidance from the Kyoto Parties. The decision, furthermore, invited in-
tergovernmental organizations, NGOs and parties to submit more information
addressing technical issues to the UNFCCC Secretariat, and requested SBSTA to
compile this information and prepare recommendations on CCS as CDM proj-
ect activities for consideration at the Bali meeting in 2007, with a view to taking
a decision at the at Poznan conference in 2008.
Between the Nairobi and the Bali meeting, two workshops called “CCS
and CDM: A Capacity Building Effort in Africa” were held in Senegal96 in Sep-
tember 2007. Shell and Statoil established the workshops upon the suggestion
of the Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands (ECN), which was responsible
for implementing the workshops. While Shell and Statoil were the main found-
ers and sponsors; the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the UK Depart-
ment of Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform supported the project; and
the UNFCCC, UNEP, the IPCC, the IEA and the European Commission also
acted as formal collaboration partners. According to the ECN, the main objec-
tive of the workshops was to provide African delegates, companies and NGOs
with reliable information about CCS technologies, in order for them to make an
informed decision about CCS in the CDM. However, the underlying expectation
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was that the workshop would inºuence African delegates to support the ap-
proval of CCS in the CDM.97
Because decision FCCC/KP/CMP/2006/L.8 established the COP 14/CMP
4 in 2008 as the designated forum for reaching a ªnal decision on the issue,
BINGO and ENGO lobbying and advocacy in Bali was insigniªcant. However,
in a SBSTA contact group on CCS in the CDM at the Bali meeting, Nigeria—rep-
resenting the Group of African Countries—spoke out in support of CCS. This
intervention represented a major shift in position, from initial opposition at the
ªrst plenary session in Nairobi to pro-CCS advocacy in Bali. As expected, how-
ever, the decision adopted at the Bali conference98 did not make a ªnal ruling on
the issue, but allowed for further submissions and one more meeting under
SBSTA before the COP 14/CMP 4 in 2008.
Assessing BINGO Efforts: Goal Attainment and Inºuence
Having demonstrated how business groups have tried to inºuence the negotia-
tions on CCS in the CDM, this section seeks to evaluate the success of these ef-
forts. First, this involves assessing goal attainment: whether the decisions and/or
the position of delegations reºect the objectives of business. As regards the deci-
sions, while the BINGOs did not achieve their ultimate goal of CCS approval—
since the decisions did not prohibit submission of projects using CCS—their ef-
forts may be read as relatively successful compared to the ENGOs who wanted
CCS ruled out. As IETA argued, “business achieved what it could achieve, which
means that CCS is still on the agenda . . . [due to the opposition from ENGOs
and some prominent Parties] it was certainly expected that there was a serious
risk that there would be a very negative response . . . that CCS would be ruled to-
tally out.”99 Furthermore, the Ad-Hoc Expert Group’s recommendation to estab-
lish a working group to enhance capacity building and discuss unresolved tech-
nical and legal issues is partly reºected in decision FCCC/KP/CMP/2006/L.8,
which requests additional workshops, submissions from parties and stake-
holders, and further analysis of the technical issues at stake before a ªnal deci-
sion is taken. Nevertheless, because ªnal approval of CCS in the CDM was not
successfully negotiated, it makes more sense to investigate BINGO goal attain-
ment in relation to procedural developments than to the ªnal outcome.
However, while the establishment of procedural goal attainment demon-
strates correlation, it does not necessarily prove causality and thus inºuence. To
establish procedural inºuence it is necessary to further investigate the causes of
goal attainment at each of the two levels outlined in the methodology: ªrst, in
relation to state positions, and second, the ªne print/details of regulations. As
previously noted, inºuence is contingent upon how and whether the activities
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of the “inºuencer” (BINGOs) brought about the intended effects in the behav-
ior of the “inºuencees” (delegations). The research framework distinguishes be-
tween three major groups of “inºuencees:” i) delegations with corresponding/
similar interests and positions; ii) delegations with opposing interests and posi-
tions, and iii) delegations with undetermined interests and positions.
The ªrst group of inºuencees consists mainly of oil-, gas- and coal-produc-
ing countries, including Japan, the United States, Australia, Canada, Norway,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Kuwait, as well as the EU. These states’ economic
dependency on the extraction of fossil fuels makes them structurally dependent
on the continued survival of the fossil-fuel industry. Because the recognition of
CCS as a mitigation option would enable these countries to continue to extract
fossil fuels and reduce their emissions, it is certainly in their interest to approve
CCS as a CDM project methodology. Many of these countries have already in-
vested heavily in research and development of CCS technologies and projects.100
For example, several medium- and large-scale CCS projects are under consider-
ation in Australia.101 Norway publicly aspires to become a leading country on
CCS, and intends to export this technology to developing countries such as
China and Indonesia.102 In partnership with major companies such as Statoil,
Shell and Aker Kværner, several of the world’s largest and most ambitious CCS
projects are currently under development and construction in Norway.103 The
EU also supports the inclusion of CCS in the CDM, as long as outstanding
methodological and technical issues are satisfactorily resolved. With a current
research portfolio on CCS worth over 170 million and several CCS initiatives
currently running in EU countries,104 it is clear that it is in the interest of the
Commission and many of the member states to have CCS approved. From a
structural perspective, the positions of these countries on CCS may be seen as
essentially determined by the interests vested in the state-industrial nexus of the
fossil-fuel sector. Therefore, business interests may be interpreted as precondi-
tioning the positions of these delegations. From a relational approach, however,
assessing BINGO inºuence on their positions (the ªrst level) is irrelevant, as
their interests correlate to begin with. Yet, BINGOs may still exercise consider-
able inºuence on formulation of the details and ªne print (the second level).
The wording of the EU position, which notes the need to resolve several techni-
cal issues before CCS could qualify as a CDM methodology,105 indicates that
there is considerable room for exercising inºuence on the details, which would
ultimately also feed into the formulation of their position (the ªrst level).
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100. Parties’ submissions to and statements made during the SBSTA workshop on CCS prior to the
Nairobi meeting demonstrate the link between their positions and national economic inter-
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101. FCCC/SBSTA/2006/7.
102. Statement by Gro Harlem Brundtland, speech to the UN Commission on Sustainable Devel-
opment, Fifteenth Session, 10 May 2007.
103. For example, the gas-powered generation facility at Mongstad and Kårstø.
104. FCCC/SBSTA/2006/7.
105. FCCC/SBSTA/2006/7; and UNFCCC 2006a.
IETA, and in particular IPIECA, representing the oil and gas sector from
which the development of CCS originates, possess much of the capacity for
technological innovation to further develop CCS as a mitigation option. They
also have the necessary (technical) knowledge and expertise to develop satisfac-
tory project methodologies and to resolve matters such as project boundary and
safety issues, possible accounting methods for long-term leakage, permanence,
site selection, monitoring methodologies, long-term liability, and the operation
of reservoirs. Industry’s capacity and expertise as such clearly provide them with
a particular leverage vis-à-vis the ENGOs in the attempt to inºuence the deci-
sion-making process, and in terms of being able to act as consultants to delega-
tions in the policy and regulatory formulation regarding the inclusion of CCS in
the regime. The EU’s lead negotiator on CCS in the CDM conªrmed the use of
industry expertise during negotiations, noting, “While we always attempt to
consider the views of all the major observer groups, in the case of CCS it was in-
dustry that had practical experience and expertise to share.”106 Business actors’
central role in the process of negotiating the details of a CCS decision is also evi-
dent by their active role during the SBSTA workshop, where members of IPIECA
were asked to make ªve presentations on technical and regulatory issues, while
the ENGOs made only one. These factors indicate that the technological inno-
vation capacity and knowledge of IPIECA, IETA and their member companies
enabled them to successfully exercise some inºuence on the details of the deci-
sion on CCS in the CDM and, more broadly, on the development of a common
approach to CCS as a mitigation option, including possibilities for managing
and regulating CCS project activities under the CDM.
The second group of “inºuencees,” the delegations opposing CCS in the
CDM, includes Brazil and some other Latin American countries. Brazil has re-
ceived a high share of investment through the CDM in renewable energy pro-
jects, such as biomass and solar energy. It therefore appears to be in Brazil’s eco-
nomic interests to exclude CCS from the CDM to minimize the risk that
investments will be diverted elsewhere. The other Latin American delegations,
for reasons unknown, appear to have brokered a deal with Brazil to support
their position. As expected, BINGO advocacy and lobbying towards these dele-
gations were unsuccessful, despite the apparently good working relationship be-
tween IETA and the Latin American countries.107 There is thus no evidence of
successful goal attainment on either level as regards this group of delegations.
The ªnal group of “inºuencees” consists of delegations whose positions
on CCS in the CDM were more or less undecided at the commencement of the
Nairobi meeting. These include the African delegations, some South Asian and
Southeast Asian countries, and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). Be-
cause of the lack of clear similarity between these groups’ positions and the
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BINGO position, a further assessment of ªrst-level goal attainment is war-
ranted. In the case of AOSIS and the Asian countries, BINGOs made few visible
efforts to lobby these groups, and there is no correlation in position. AOSIS has
remained true to its long-standing alliance with the ENGOs108 and opposed
CCS in the CDM. While China has not announced its position on the issue, In-
dia came out against CCS in the CDM in the Bali contact group.109 As regards the
African delegations, however, the data indicate both correlation and causation.
Indeed, the positions of the African delegations changed from initial opposition
in Nairobi to explicit support in Bali. The apparent change in their position dur-
ing the Nairobi conference corresponds with BINGOs’ efforts to convince Afri-
can delegates of the beneªts of CCS in the CDM, while the explicit shift in posi-
tion that became evident in the Bali contact group matches the intention of the
CCS-Africa workshops held prior to the meeting. According to Shell, one of the
main founders and organizers of CCS-Africa, the workshops made a signiªcant
contribution to the shift in position from Nairobi to Bali.110
While it is clearly possible to establish ªrst-level BINGO goal attainment
towards the African delegations, establishing causation, and thus inºuence, is
problematic. Unfortunately, no African delegate was willing to comment on the
degree to which business actors inºuenced the change in position. Indeed,
while the BINGOs and the CCS-Africa workshop organizers viewed their efforts
as successful,111 perceptions of inºuence can be exaggerated. Therefore, while
there is clear evidence of correlation, one can only make a cautious assumption
as regards causation between business activities and the positions of the African
delegations.
Explaining BINGO Efforts: How and Why Are BINGOs Inºuential?
The case demonstrates the various ways in which BINGOs seek to inºuence cli-
mate negotiations at the international level. Formal and informal access and
communication channels between BINGO staff/members, national delegations
and the secretariat facilitate the transmission and exchange of views and infor-
mation, which may take on various forms ranging from formal letters and poli-
cy statements to ad-hoc advocacy papers, workshops and formal or informal
meetings. BINGOs lobby a wide range of delegations and secretariat staff during
negotiations, including delegations from developing countries, LDC and staff
from the UNFCCC subsidiary working bodies. They also cooperate with inter-
national institutions to establish arenas for knowledge dissemination and thus
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information-based advocacy, as was evident with the CCS-Africa workshop.
As such, business inºuence at the international level is enabled by their capacity
to draw on established networks of relationships with decision-makers. The
case, therefore, does not support the conventional assumption—as posed by
Hirst and Thompson112—that corporations are less inclined to be transnational
agents than are NGOs. These ªndings also differ from previous research on
channels of corporate inºuence in the climate negotiations, which found that
business inºuence at the international level has been limited due to the absence
of social ties between industry groups and country delegates and the apparent
insulation of international institutions from business pressures.113 The case il-
lustrates the relatively recent change in business organization within the climate
regime, which may be noted since the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol and its as-
sociated ºexibility mechanisms.
The CCS case illustrates how BINGO inºuence within the climate negotia-
tions may be conceptualized as a form of “technological power.”114 Business’s
control and ownership of energy technologies, and its ability to draw on tech-
nological expertise and know-how in the context of negotiations, constitute an
important source of power. In the climate regime, innovation processes that
originate and stem from industry research and practice drive much of the devel-
opment of new mitigation technologies and regulatory instruments. Indeed,
this was the case with geological CCS, which is increasingly recognized as a mit-
igation option with great potential to reduce emissions on a global basis. Cor-
porate power can therefore be conceptualized partly in structural terms, as
derived from business’s innovation capacity and control and ownership of miti-
gation technologies. But technological power also provides a source of inºuence
in a more relational sense. Business’s expertise and possession of technological
information enables it to inºuence the views and positions of other actors, and
the development of policy and regulatory text. In this case, it is clear that
IPIECA’s and IETA’s expertise in the ªeld of CCS technologies provided them
with a privileged position vis-à-vis the ENGOs in terms of providing input to
delegates on the issue, particularly as regards the details of regulatory design.
The CCS-Africa workshops, too, illustrate how business’ capacity as technologi-
cal innovators attributes to them legitimacy as sources of policy-relevant knowl-
edge and as political players. In this case, such legitimacy enabled them to ar-
range workshops in collaboration with highly acclaimed research institutions
and international organizations such as the IEA, IPCC and UNEP, through
which business can disseminate information and engage in information-based
lobbying and advocacy. As such, the case exempliªes how technological power
allows BINGOs “to play a decisive role in shaping regulatory discourses, particu-
larly with regard to the design and phasing of environmental regulations.”115
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Conclusion
This article has assessed the nature, scope and effect of the activities and strate-
gies of Business and Industry NGOs (BINGOs) within the international negoti-
ations of the Kyoto Mechanisms under the UNFCCC. The BINGO constituency
constitutes an increasingly diverse group of organizations with differing views
on climate change mitigation and GHG regulation. Placing BINGOs that are ac-
tive in the regime along a continuum from “gray” to “green,” it is evident that
business activities and mandates have moved towards the green(er) end of the
spectrum, reºecting a more general shift in corporate strategies from opposition
towards more accommodative and constructive approaches to climate change
mitigation.
The paper developed a methodology for measuring and analyzing the
inºuence of BINGOs in the regime. The methodology combines an examina-
tion of how BINGOs attempt to exercise inºuence (by looking at access, re-
sources and activities) with an assessment of goal attainment and its determi-
nants in relation to both the negotiation process and the ªnal outcome. This
framework was applied to a case study of the negotiation of Carbon Capture
and Storage (CCS) technologies as a mitigation option under the CDM. The re-
view of BINGO activities showed that BINGOs appear to have exercised consid-
erable inºuence on the process of negotiating a regulatory design for including
CCS as a CDM project activity. The case also established BINGO goal attain-
ment vis-à-vis the African delegations, which changed their position from oppo-
sition to support for CCS in the CDM from the Nairobi to the Bali meeting.
While the case also indicates causation between BINGO lobbying and advocacy
efforts and the position of group of African delegations, the evidence only war-
rants a cautious inference of the inºuence of BINGOs in this particular case.
In contrast to previous research on business inºuence in the climate nego-
tiations, this paper has demonstrated how BINGOs strategically utilize net-
works, informal relationships and social ties with a multitude of delegations,
international organizations and UNFCCC secretariat staff to disseminate infor-
mation about business preferences and put pressure on decision-makers. Con-
sequently, transnational networks appear to facilitate business efforts to inºu-
ence the negotiation process at the international level, which corresponds to a
growing emphasis on the regulatory effects of networks in the literature.116 It is
also evident that the technological ownership, innovation capacities and know-
how of BINGOs and their members provide them with particular capabilities
and leverage vis-à-vis other nonstate actors. Technological power enables busi-
ness to inºuence delegations and to play a central role in the shaping of regula-
tory frameworks for climate change mitigation.
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Introduction 
 
When climate change first emerged on the political agenda in the early 1990s, talk 
of the need to curb emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases 
(GHGs) encountered strong and united, business opposition. Throughout the 
1990s, the fossil-fuel lobby—representing leading U.S. companies from the oil, 
coal, chemical, and automobile industries—led a public and political crusade 
against GHG regulations which severely limited the viability of federal action. 
These pollution-intensive industries obscured the science and economics of GHG 
regulation by funding contrarian research, negative advertisement and direct 
lobbying of Congress and the White House. Indeed, it is widely acknowledged 
that business opposition to GHG regulation provides a major explanation for 
Washington’s lack of climate action in the 1990s and well into the next decade, 
including the blockage of Kyoto Protocol ratification. 
 However, by the turn of the century, it became increasingly evident that a 
growing, albeit small, number of prominent U.S. corporations were beginning to 
adopt more accommodating approaches to climate change mitigation. By 2005, 
the number of climate-constructive business organizations had increased 
significantly. By 2007, a coalition of leading U.S. industries, including some of 
America’s largest utilities, coal mining, chemical manufacturers and 
environmental organizations, had established a new pro-regulation lobby. Now, 
the gradual shift in business strategy from opposition to regulatory support had 
become manifest in political action, and as the coalition started lobbying the 
Capitol for a federal cap-and-trade program, the previous business veto on climate 
legislation was effectively broken. 
 This article provides an account of this strategic shift amongst leading 
U.S. industries from opposition to support for GHG legislation and examines its 
effect on U.S. climate politics. It begins by presenting a model for analyzing 
change in business political strategies that emphasizes how the dynamics between 
embryonic, multilevel governance and corporate preferences can generate new 
conditions for change and lead to so-called “tipping points” in business strategies. 
Tipping points are defined as thresholds at which the strategies of a critical mass 
of affected industries have begun to exercise support and push for regulatory 
change.1 It is argued that the materialization of a tipping point is also likely to 
generate new political momentum and more enabling conditions for political 
bargaining, which may spur considerable progress in the legislative process. 
The tipping point model is then utilized to analyze U.S. climate politics 
between 1990 and 2010. Through a detailed case study of business lobbying and 
the evolution of climate politics in this period, this model demonstrates how the 
                                                 
1 Vormedal 2011. 
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strategies of a prominent share of leading U.S. businesses “tipped” in response to 
emerging conditions. The analysis also illustrates that while business opposition 
provided a major obstacle to regulatory change for over a decade, this dynamic 
clearly changed after the manifestation of a tipping point. Indeed, from 2007, 
many previously antagonistic U.S. businesses started to play an enabling and 
constructive role in the drafting of new GHG legislation. First, in the negotiation 
and drafting of the Waxman-Markey climate bill—which was successfully 
adopted by the House of Representatives in July 2009—and second, in 
negotiating and collecting support for the Senate version of the bill, known as the 
Kerry-Lieberman-Graham (KGL) “tripartisan” initiative. However, despite 
widespread business support and lobbying for its adoption, the KGL ultimately 
fell short of collecting the 60 Senate votes needed for it to become legislation. But 
this time around it was not business opposition but the lack of presidential 
commitment and the tough political environment before the midterm election that 
led senators to pull the plug on climate legislation in the 111th Congress. 
 
The Interplay between Environmental Governance and Business Strategies: The 
Tipping Point Model 
 
All corporations operate within a broader societal structure that determines the 
scope and conditions for current and future business operations. Changes in a 
corporation’s external environment, such as new regulations and policies, 
technological developments, shifts in public opinion or consumer preferences, can 
alter the limits and possibilities of business conduct. Corporations must therefore 
continuously consider how expectations, demands, and future trends in the 
external environment are likely to affect their organization.2 
 For those corporations whose operations, products or services cause 
environmental degradation, new mitigation policies and regulations may limit 
their ability to conduct business as usual. Regulations that require a significant 
reduction of hazardous emissions may induce high compliance and adjustment 
costs if there is no technologically feasible or commercially viable alternative. 
Because such environmental regulations may threaten the business models of 
large emitters, the anticipation of new regulations and/or de-facto regulatory 
developments represent an important determinant of corporate strategy.3 
 When proposals for new environmental regulations first emerge on the 
policy agenda, affected industries are likely to pursue a strategy of opposition. 
Indeed, initial business resistance to emerging environmental governance—such 
as publicly questioning the underlying scientific claims and warning against the 
                                                 
2 Johnson et al. 2005; Gunningham et al. 2003. 
3 Henriques and Sadorsky 1995; Rugman and Verbeke 1998a; 1998b. 
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costs associated with regulatory action—is well documented.4 For example, in the 
case of ozone layer depletion, the large producers of Chlorofluorocarbons 
(CFCs)—the major ozone depleting substance—led a Congressional lobbying 
effort which argued that the scientific basis for regulatory action was weak and 
inconclusive, and that any mandatory restriction on the use of CFCs would be too 
costly.5 
However, under certain conditions that may emerge as a particular issue 
area of environmental governance matures, business opposition is likely to 
decrease, become more fragmented and shift towards regulatory support. This 
model emphasizes three conditions that may cause corporations and business 
lobbies to begin to support and/or push for the adoption of new environmental 
regulations; i) the emergence of uneven playing fields, ii) the increase of 
regulatory threats and uncertainties and iii) the proliferation of new market 
opportunities. 
First, efforts to deal with modern environmental problems are usually 
multiple and fragmented. Such environmental problems are commonly trans-
boundary in nature, meaning that pollution or toxic wastes are transmitted through 
water or air across geopolitical units. The effects of trans-boundary pollution are 
experienced not only near the source but also far from the source, and even to 
other countries in the GHG case. Moreover, the globalization of the world 
economy has led to a diffusion of environmentally-harmful production methods 
and products. Multinationals have amplified the transnational nature of 
environmental problems by moving their production to and between new, low-
cost regions and countries. While some local environmental problems such as the 
depletion of a natural resource might be treated in isolation, efforts to mitigate 
trans-boundary and transnational problems seldom emerge in one country alone. 
Therefore, they are likely to clarion calls for concerted international action. 
The emergence of an international regime often marks a defining moment 
in time when the environmental problem’s scientific evidence, salience and 
urgency has gained almost universal acceptance. Yet, processes of institutional 
formation are usually tedious and may be stalled by countries seeking to free-ride 
on the actions of others. Therefore, in its early phases of development, 
environmental-governance structures may constitute an uneven patchwork of 
different standards and measures at multiple and sometimes overlapping levels. 
This scenario in-effect creates uneven playing fields for regionally and/or globally 
competitive industries, as companies operating in regulated localities have a 
competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis companies operating in unregulated or less 
regulated areas. At this point we may expect those industries that are 
                                                 
4 Falkner 2008, 54. 
5 Ibid., 55. 
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disproportionally disadvantaged by non-universal compliance costs to begin to 
push for regionally or internationally harmonized rules.6 
 Second, the growth of governance measures and political pressures for 
new or more stringent regulations will increase perceptions of regulatory 
uncertainty and risks among liable industries. Because uncertainty impedes 
corporations’ ability to plan future investments, over time the cost of inaction may 
be perceived as greater than the cost of compliance. Furthermore, if political 
momentum for regulation persist and corporations are faced with a high 
probability or perceived inevitability of being regulated in the short to medium 
term, many liable industries may begin to prefer to adopt regulations to enhance 
predictability. Many will also seek to support and become constructively engaged 
in the regulatory process in order to get a seat at the negotiating table, where they 
can push for and shape rules that favor their strategic positioning.7 
 Third, regulatory uncertainties also create business opportunities. 
Environmental regulations, or the credible threat of future regulations, signal the 
coming of a market shift towards greener production and may spur investments in 
clean technologies and production methods. Early movers in the development of 
technological solutions may find their strategic positioning improved vis-à-vis 
competitors. As Falkner argues, ‘if market leaders can hope to lower the 
compliance costs relative to their competitors, then an increase in regulatory 
standards and compliance costs may shift the competitive balance in their favor, 
thus making regulation more acceptable to them.’8 Therefore, market 
opportunities related to new regulation may impel emerging technological 
frontrunners to begin to pursue a strategy of regulatory entrepreneurship.9 
 In sum, under and in response to one or a combination of the above 
conditions—including emerging or de-facto uneven playing fields, the growth of 
regulatory threats and uncertainties, and the proliferation of market 
opportunities—the strategies of affected corporations and business lobbies may 
shift from opposition to regulatory support and entrepreneurship. 
The model identifies the threshold at which a critical mass of leading 
industries and business lobbies begins to lobby for regulatory change as the 
manifestation of a “tipping point.” Tipping points signal the disruption of a 
previous trajectory or path and the commencement of new political advocacy and 
action. The concept of tipping was first introduced by sociologists studying 
segregation in American cities.10 Later, it was further developed by Schelling, 
who defined tipping as the point “when a recognizable new minority enters a 
                                                 
6 Vormedal 2011; DeSombre 1995.  
7 Hoffman and Woody 2008, 20; Vormedal 2011. 
8 Falkner 2008, 34. 
9 Vormedal 2011. 
10 Grodzins 1957; Mayer 1960. 
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neighborhood in sufficient numbers to cause the earlier residents to begin 
evacuating.”11 In contrast to more recent and popular notions of tipping points—
such as Malcom Gladwell’s definition of tipping as ‘change that does not happen 
gradually but at one dramatic moment’12—this article departs from Schelling’s 
notion of it as a threshold which is part of a gradual and cumulative process of 
change. It begins among the few, gradually builds up to change among a critical 
mass, and becomes manifest in new forms of political activity. 
It should be noted that a tipping point in business strategies does not imply 
that all liable industries and business lobbies have become regulatory 
entrepreneurs or favor legislation, but that a clearly identifiable and prevailing 
group of corporations and/or business lobbies—large enough to make a political 
difference—have begun to exercise support and push for regulatory change.13 
The rate of change may depend on the nature of existing triggers and 
conditions. First, the velocity and form of the embryonic, environmental 
governance structures influence perceptions of risks and opportunities and 
therefore strategy construction. Stronger political and regulatory momentum 
hastens strategic change, while political setbacks and decreasing momentum may 
cause the process to slow down. Second, the more fragmented and uneven the 
playing field, the larger the efforts by competitively-disadvantaged industries to 
lobby for harmonized rules. Third, change will depend on available adaptation 
strategies, i.e. rate of innovation and the commercial viability of alternative 
technologies and production methods. Finally, one might also identify a certain 
psychological dynamic behind and inherent to the tipping point process. 
Perceptions of risk are often informed by the risk perceptions of others. The 
likelihood of universal adoption increases when a particular interpretation of 
threats and opportunities is shared by a critical mass of market actors. Because an 
actor’s strategy is partly influenced by de-facto or expected actions of others, 
tipping points are more likely to materialize when a sizeable share of dominant 
corporations anticipates that future adoption of regulation is very likely, if not 
inevitable. 
Empirically, the observed and verifiable change in the strategies, goals and 
activities of business lobbies over time provides a functional indicator of a tipping 
point. The most prominent and active business lobbies in a particular issue area 
usually represent large and dominant market actors directly affected by the 
existing or proposed regulations. The process of “tipping” can thus be informed 
by longitudinally tracking changes in the constellation of strategies and activities 
of dominant business lobbies. 
                                                 
11 Schelling 1971, 181. 
12 Gladwell 2000, 9. 
13 Vormedal 2011. 
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Tipping points are also likely to spur the creation of “Baptist and 
bootlegger” coalitions of business and environmental organizations. In the 
analogy, both ‘Baptists and bootleggers favor prohibition or regulations on 
alcohol, the former for religious or moral reasons, the latter because of the profit 
they can make on illegal liquor.’14 In this case, environmental organizations and 
businesses will join forces to lobby for regulations, the former for moral reasons, 
and the latter for reasons of competitiveness. Finally, a tipping point in business 
strategies may also generate new political momentum. When the strategies of key 
business lobbies ‘tip’ and these groups begin to push for the adoption of new 
regulation and/or legislation, it improves conditions for political bargaining and 
places constructive pressure on the rule-making process. The dispersion of 
antagonistic lobbying and the parallel emergence of lobbying for regulatory 
change may thus spur legislators to take action. 
The tipping point model differs from other, notable frameworks for 
analyzing the intersection of business strategies and environmental governance. 
The neo-Gramsican model rightly emphasizes how business strategies are 
structurally determined, that is, how they are influenced by the evolution of 
environmental governance itself. Yet, the a priori assumption of markets and 
market actors’ structural power in the construction of hegemonic fields15 in 
environmental governance16 provides a rather deterministic account of regulatory 
outcomes. The model lacks a more precise notion of how dynamics between 
structures and actors’ preferences can generate conditions for trajectory change. 
The neo-pluralist school, on the other hand, provides a less deterministic account 
that considers environmental governance a pluralistic field where the power of 
actors to shape policy outcomes is determined by the particular range of 
constraints and opportunities pertaining to the given issue-area.17 Falkner’s model 
for business power and conflict18 has contributed significantly to our 
understanding of corporate preference and strategy formation. However, it fails to 
explain how and why business strategies change over time and provides an 
unsatisfactory account of how dynamics between strategic engagement and 
governance can generate conditions for change. Therefore, by emphasizing and 
demonstrating mechanisms for change and the significance of dynamic thresholds 
in triggering momentum and progress, the tipping point model provides a timely 
extension of the neo-pluralist account of the intersection of business strategies and 
environmental governance. 
                                                 
14 DeSombre 1995, 54. 
15 Hegemony is defined as the unison of economic, political and ideological aims and beliefs 
amongst members of a dominant group who exercise leadership in society.  
16 Levy and Newell 2005. 
17 Cerny 2010. 
18 Falkner 2008. 
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In the next section, the article utilizes the tipping point model to analyze 
the development of business lobbying and climate change politics in the United 
States between 1990 and 2010. 
 
Business Strategies and Climate Change Politics in the United States 
 
Climate change represents one of the most complex and pressing environmental 
problems facing mankind today. Since 1850, the global mean temperature has 
increased by 0.76 C, and if appropriate action is not taken, the average surface 
temperature is likely to rise by a further 1.8- 6.4 C over the course of the 
century.19 An overwhelming majority of scientists now conclude that most 
warming since the advent of the industrial era is caused by human activities which 
release heat-trapping greenhouse gases (GHGs) into the atmosphere.20 The most 
important sources of GHGs are fossil-fuel consumption, agriculture, and land-use 
changes such as deforestation. If temperatures rise more than 2 C above pre-
industrial levels, global warming may bring about irreversible and potentially 
catastrophic changes in the earth’s climate system. Widespread melting of snow 
and ice would cause sea levels to rise between 18 and 59 cm, producing more 
frequent and extreme weather events including droughts, floods and storms.21 As 
such, climate change is not only an environmental problem, but represents an all-
encompassing threat to development, economic growth, human security, food 
supplies and health.22 
 
Denial and Opposition: A Non-Climate for Change 
 
In the United States, climate change first emerged on the political agenda in the 
early 1980s. In response to growing alarm from scientists, a number of 
congressional hearings were held to investigate the global warming problem. In 
1988 Dr. Hansen of NASA testified to the House that the greenhouse effect was 
already occurring, and that an almost unprecedented warming of the earth’s 
atmosphere was to be expected in the coming century.23 Climate change quickly 
rose to become an internationally recognized problem, and in 1990, when the 
newly established Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concluded 
that GHGs were likely to cause global warming, the international community 
called for negotiations for a multilateral convention to curb the rise of GHG 
emissions. 
                                                 
19 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007b. 
20 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007a; Human Development Report 2007/8. 
21 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007c. 
22 Human Development Report 2007/8; Agder et al. 2003; O’Brien 2006. 
23 Manzur and Lee 1993. 
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 Fossil-fuel-intensive industries reacted swiftly and aggressively in 
response to the emerging regulatory threat. Over 50 companies and trade 
associations from oil, coal, chemical manufacturing and automobile industries 
formed a new, anti-regulation lobby—the Global Climate Coalition (GCC)24—
which quickly rose to become the most prominent business voice on climate 
change. To block U.S. legislative action, the GCC sought to spread doubt about 
the scientific and economic basis for limiting GHG emissions. The lobby argued 
that the theory of anthropogenic warming was based on a series of scientific 
uncertainties, and that the observed rise in the average ocean and air temperatures 
reflected a natural climate variability. They also argued that regulating GHGs 
would be too costly and cause serious economic decline and loss of employment 
in the United States.25 
 In 1992, President George H.W. Bush signed the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which established a shared goal to 
stabilize GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system (Article 2). But 
since the Convention did not include mandatory targets and timetables for 
emissions reductions, the GCC considered their campaign a success.26 
 After the ratification of the UNFCCC and during the years of the Clinton 
administration (1992-2000), the GCC scaled up their efforts to prevent Congress 
and the White House from adopting federal climate policies and legislation. When 
President Clinton proposed the BTU tax27 in 1992 to achieve his campaign goal of 
reducing emissions to 1990 levels, the business lobby quickly set out to melt it 
down. In 1993 the bill was declared dead due to the vast opposition from industry 
associations.28 The GCC used advertising and “front groups” to spread opposition 
to climate action amongst the general public. For example, the Information 
Council for the Environment (ICE)29 launched a number of media campaigns 
which sought “to reposition global warming as a theory, not a fact,” targeting 
what they considered vulnerable groups such as “older, less educated men” and 
“young, low income women.”30 GCC members also set up a Science Advisory 
                                                 
24 GCC members included American Petroleum Institute, Amoco, Chevron, the Chrysler 
Corporation, Dow Chemicals, Duke Energy, DuPont, Edison Electric Institute, ExxonMobil, the 
National Mining Association, Shell, and Texaco, U.S. Chamber of Commerce. 
25 Dunn 2002; Levy 2005; Levy and Egan 1998; Skodvin and Skjærseth 2003; Corporate Watch 
Magazine 1997. Disguise the limit: The Global Climate Coalition. Issue 4. 
26 Legget 2001; Newell and Paterson 1998; Levy and Egan 1998. 
27 Legget 2001; Newell and Paterson 1998; Levy and Egan 1998. 
28 Pooley 2010, 86-87; Levy and Egan 1998; Skodvin and Andresen 2009. 
29 The ECE was founded in 1991 by GCC members from the coal, oil and utility industries—
including the Edison Electric Institute and the National Coal Association.  
30 Levy and Egan 1998, 350; Pooley 2010, 41. 
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Panel fronted by prominent climate skeptics31 that received industry funding. 
Some ran advertisements on TV and distributed educational kits for classrooms, 
which argued that climate change was not a real problem.32 In addition, the lobby 
commissioned a series of economic studies, which argued that GHG regulation 
would cause serious economic decline and that measures to curb emissions by 20 
percent would reduce GDP by 4 percent and slay 1.1 million jobs annually.33 In 
Congress, the GCC successfully managed to gain the support of a key group of 
Republicans.34 In a 1995 congressional hearing, the chair of the House Science 
Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Dana Rohrabacher, invited several 
industry-funded “skeptics” to testify before her committee, after which she 
publicly declared global warming a “liberal clap trap.” Later that year, the House 
approved a bill that prohibited the EPA from spending money on climate change 
research.35 
Meanwhile, the Clinton administration agreed to the “Berlin Mandate” 
which established a path for negotiating international reduction targets for 
industrialized countries under the UNFCCC. The GCC responded with a third line 
of attack, focusing on the loss of U.S. competitiveness under an international 
protocol that exempted developing countries from legally binding emission 
limitations. To prevent U.S. participation, the GCC allegedly hand-picked Senator 
Chuck Hagel of Nebraska to sponsor a “sense of the senate” resolution together 
with Senator Robert Byrd (West Virginia),36 which stated that “the United States 
should not be a signatory to any protocol, at negotiations in Kyoto or thereafter, 
which do not mandate developing nations to abide by the same restriction 
imposed on the United States, or that would result in serious harm to the U.S. 
economy.”37 Four months prior to the Kyoto meeting, the senate adopted Byrd-
Hagel by a unanimous vote (97-0). While the Clinton administration signed the 
Kyoto protocol in 1997, the President never submitted the treaty for ratification in 
the Senate because it would have suffered humiliating defeat.38 
In 2000, the newly elected President George W. Bush announced that his 
administration would formally withdraw its Kyoto signature due to lack of Senate 
support and its negative effects on growth, jobs and U.S. competitiveness.39 Anti-
                                                 
31 These included S. Fred Singer, Pat Michaels and Robert Balling. 
32 Levy and Egan 1998; Levy 2005. 
33 Levy and Egan 1998, 351. 
34 Including the Chair of the House Science Subcommittee on Energy and Environment Dana 
Rohrabacher (California), the House Majority Whip John Doolittle (California) and Chair of the 
Science Committee Robert Walker (Pennsylvania). 
35 Levy and Egan 1998, 344. 
36 Fischer 2006. 
37 Byrd-Hagel Resolution, 105th Congress, 1st Session, S. Res. 98. 
38 Interview with Senator Byrd. 
39 Speech delivered in Washington by President George W. Bush on 11 June 2001. 
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climate business lobbyists played a major role the construction of the new White 
House climate policy or lack thereof. In 2001, the administration hired the ex oil-
lobbyist Philip Cooney40 as chief of staff at the White House Council on 
Environmental Quality (CEQ),41 and former ExxonMobil lobbyist Larisa E. 
Dobriansky as deputy assistant secretary for national energy policy with 
responsibility for managing the department’s Office for Climate Change Policy. 
At the CEQ, Cooney led a systematic effort to downplay the urgency of climate 
action by editing climate change reports produced by the federal bureaucracy. 
According to a House committee investigation, Cooney made nearly 300 edits to 
the administration’s Climate Change Science Program’s strategic plan, edits 
designed to “exaggerate or emphasize scientific uncertainties or to deemphasize 
or diminish the importance of the human role in global warming.”42 Furthermore, 
in the EPA’s Draft Report on the Environment, White House staff insisted on 
edits so extreme that the EPA choose to eliminate the entire section on climate 
change.43 However, by 2005, the formal influence of these corporate lobbyists 
came to a halt. After a leak exposing Cooney’s edits to the New York Times, he 
resigned from the White House and went to work for ExxonMobil.44 The 
Guardian also exposed documents that showed the Under Secretary of State Paula 
Dobriansky, Larisa Dobriansky’s sister, thanking ExxonMobil executives for their 
active engagement with the administration on climate change policy. This 
indicated that the President’s withdrawal from Kyoto was partly based on input 
from the GCC.45 
In sum, the above review of business lobbying during the Bush Sr., 
Clinton and Bush Jr. administrations clearly illustrate how business opposition to 
climate policy and legislation severely limited the scope for federal action to 
mitigate climate change. 
 
Scaling Up: Emerging, Multilevel Climate Governance 
  
Nevertheless, by the turn of the century, a new wave of climate-related 
governance initiatives emerged at the state and municipal levels. State-level 
regulation is significant because large U.S. states such as Texas and California 
have emissions equivalent to or larger than many key industrialized countries 
                                                 
40 For fifteen years Cooney worked as a lobbyist for the American Petroleum Institute (API). At 
the API Cooney had worked to ensure that federal climate policy was consistent with the 
objectives of Big Oil, and to make sure that uncertainties and doubts regarding global warming 
science became part of the conventional wisdom. 
41 Pooley 2010, 46. 
42 Ibid., 47. 
43 Ibid., 47. 
44 Ibid., 47. 
45 The Guardian, “Revealed: How Oil Giant Influenced Bush,” 8 June 2005. 
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participating in the Kyoto Protocol. By 2006, 28 states had issued climate action 
plans, 9 had established state-wide GHG reduction targets, and 22 had 
implemented renewable energy portfolio standards for electric utilities and power 
plants. Half of all U.S. states had also established public funding in support of 
energy efficiency and/or renewable energy development.46 In California, the 
legislature has adopted targets to reduce GHG emissions 11 percent by 2010, 25 
percent by 2020 and 80 percent by 2050 in large industrial sectors such as 
utilities, oil refining and cement production.47 Governor Schwarzenegger has also 
launched an initiative to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from vehicles.48 Many 
other states have joined forces to establish common GHG reduction goals and 
regulatory systems. In 2001, six New England states committed to reduce their 
emissions to 1990 levels by 2010 and 10 percent below 1990 levels by 2020. In 
2005, ten North-East and Mid-Atlantic states formed the ‘Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative’ (RGGI): a cap-and-trade scheme which aims to stabilize emissions 
from large power plants from 2009 to 2014, and subsequently to racket-down 
GHG caps by 25.5 percent a year.49 
 Furthermore, a coalition of states has engaged in a series of legal suits 
against the federal government for its inaction on climate change mitigation. In 
1999, the International Centre for Technology Assessment and 18 other 
organizations petitioned the EPA to establish GHG standards for new vehicles 
under the Clean Air Act. In 2003, the EPA denied the petition, since Congress had 
not granted EPA the authority to regulate GHGs.50 A few months later, the state 
of Massachusetts, joined by 12 other states4 and U.S. territories, filed a new 
petition to review the EPA’s ruling, but in 2005 the Court of Appeals sided with 
the EPA. Despite this setback, Massachusetts et al. appealed to the U.S. Supreme 
Court51 and in 2007 it ruled in their favor, requiring the EPA to assess and adopt 
an official position on the public health risks posed by GHG emissions. The 
Court’s decision granted the EPA the authority needed to regulate GHGs.52 
 The number of U.S. municipalities implementing climate-change policies 
also grew during this period. By 2006, 150 out of 674 local governments 
participating in the Cities for Climate Protection program (CCP)53 were located in 
the United States. Participation in the CCP requires cities to establish energy and 
emissions inventories and forecasts, emissions reduction targets, a plan for 
implementation and a process for monitoring and verifying results. Furthermore, 
                                                 
46 Selin and VanDeveer 2007. 
47 California Assembly Bill 32, The Global Warming Solutions Act. 
48 California Low Carbon Fuel Standard.  
49 An initiative of the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic States of the United States.  
50 United States Environmental Protection Agency. 28 August 2003.  
51 "EPA Set to regulate Greenhouse Gas Emissions," by Brian Lewis, Ph.D. 26 July 2010.  
52 Supreme Court Decision on Massachusetts et al. vs. EPA. 2 April 2007. 
53 The CCP is part of the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives. 
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by 2006 over 275 mayors representing more than 48 million Americans had 
accepted Mayor Nickels’ (Seattle) challenge to adopt the U.S.-Kyoto 
commitment.54 
 Meanwhile, other industrialized nations were moving forward to ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol and implement national and/or regional systems for reducing 
GHGs. In 2003, the European Union (EU) adopted Directive 2003/87/EC 
establishing the world’s largest, economy-wide GHG trading program—the EU 
Emissions Trading System (ETS)—which entered into force in January 2005. The 
system also linked up with Kyoto’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), 
allowing European industry to buy and sell most credits acquired from emissions-
reduction projects in developing countries.55 
 After the White House’s withdrawal from Kyoto, several attempts to 
introduce federal, emissions-trading-based legislation emerged in the Capitol, 
albeit unsuccessfully. In 2003, Senators Joe Lieberman and John McCain 
sponsored the Climate Stewardship act, which sought to reduce GHG emissions 
from major utilities through federal cap-and-trade. The bill was defeated 55 to 43 
in a Senate vote. A revised version of McCain-Lieberman was also defeated in 
2005, this time collecting only 38 votes.56 Yet, the congressional debates on 
federal climate action were becoming more substantial and constructive. In 2005, 
the Senate adopted a “sense of the senate” resolution stating that human activity 
was causing climate change, and that this required the Senate to implement 
federal legislation in the future.57 
 These developments illustrate that despite the lack of federal climate 
policy and regulation in this period, from the turn of the century many U.S. 
industries nevertheless faced growing regulatory pressures at home and abroad. 
The establishment of new regulatory schemes at the state level and in other 
developed economies, coupled with the Supreme Court ruling which granted the 
EPA authority to regulate GHGs in the future, signaled that the political 
momentum to legally curb GHGs was not going to fade. Indeed, in the medium to 
                                                 
54 Selin and VanDeever 2007. 
55 Ironically, the concept of emissions trading was not born in the EU but in Washington. The 
idea—influenced by the EPA Acid Rain Program, which established cap-and-trade scheme for 
sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides—was first developed by the Environmental Defense Fund 
(EDF). In 1996, the EDF began selling it to the EPA, Energy Department, State Department and 
finally the White House, who took it to Kyoto. Indeed, at this point the Europeans were skeptical 
of this American innovation, which many believe contained too many American “capitalist 
characteristics.” But lead negotiator Eizenstat managed to reach a compromise: In exchange for 
“market mechanisms” the United States would agree to stronger emission reduction targets. 
However, the problem was that due to the Byrd-Hagel resolution, global cap-and-trade wouldn’t 
fly in the U.S. Senate.  
56 Pooley 2010. 
57 Selin and VanDeever 2007. 
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long-term, the adoption of more widespread and stringent GHG regulation was 
becoming increasingly likely. 
 
The Tipping Point in Business Strategies 
 
In parallel, a growing share of leading U.S. industries started to recognize the 
global warming problem and adopt more accommodative positions on mitigation. 
The emerging scientific consensus and policy responses to global warming forced 
many prominent companies to reconsider their lobbying tactics.58 In 1997, 
DuPont and BP pulled out of the GCC, followed by Shell Oil in 1998, Ford in 
1999 and DamlierChrysler, GM and Texaco in 2000. Defending BP’s withdrawal 
from the coalition, CEO Lord Browne argued that “the time to consider the policy 
dimensions of climate change is not when the link between GHGs and climate 
change is conclusively proven, but when the possibility cannot be discounted and 
is taken seriously by the society of which we are part. We in BP have reached that 
point.”59 By 2002 the majority of GCC’s prominent members had withdrawn their 
support and the GCC officially closed shop. 
 Four years later, negotiations for a new, pro-regulation lobbying coalition 
of U.S. businesses and environmental organizations was secretly taking shape.60 
The core group consisted of 6 corporations and 4 Washington NGO 
heavyweights: Alcoa, BP America, Caterpillar, Duke Energy, DuPont, and 
General Electric (GE), and the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), the World 
Resources Institute (WRI), Pew Center on Global Climate Change, and the 
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC). In January 2007, the U.S. Climate 
Action Partnership (USCAP) revealed its “Call for Action,” a policy-advocacy 
document which called for swift legislative action at the federal level to slow, stop 
and reverse the growth of GHG emissions in the United States. The USCAP 
argued that climate change science was now uncontroversial, and that the 
technological and product innovations needed to allow the phasing-out of GHGs 
would lead to increased U.S. competitiveness and energy security. Therefore, the 
USCAP recommended that Congress should enact a mandatory curb on GHG 
emissions for large stationary sources, transportation, and energy use in 
commercial and residential buildings as quickly as possible. To deliver the 
                                                 
58 Skodvin and Skjærseth 2003. 
59 SourceWatch. Statement made by BP CEO in 1997.  
60 Vormedal 2008. In Europe and in the international arena, more progressive business lobbies 
supportive of the need for GHG regulation and seeking to influence the regulatory development 
had begun to emerge a few years earlier, at the same time as the break-up of the GCC. These 
include organizations such as the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA), 
BusinessEurope, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) and the 3C 
Business Leaders Initiative. 
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required short and mid-term emissions reduction targets,61 the government should 
establish a federal cap-and-trade program alongside a national system for 
incentives to accelerate technology research, development and deployment. 
By September 2007, the USCAP had more than doubled its membership, 
now representing over 25 of the world’s largest corporations from a range of 
different sectors. These included many former GCC members from the coal, oil, 
electric utilities, automobile and chemical manufacturing industries.62 
 Shortly after its launch, the Chairwoman of the Environment and Public 
Works Committee, Barbara Boxer (California), invited a group of USCAP CEOs 
to testify before the committee. Present at the hearing was Senator John Warner 
(Virginia), who had just started working with Senator Lieberman on a new 
climate bill. “You CEOs,” he argued after hearing what the executives had to say, 
“have begun to move this whole new concept into the Big Leagues now [...] 
When I see such an extraordinary cross section of America’s free enterprise 
system, together with the environmental groups, come and form a group like 
this—you’ve got my attention.”63 Indeed, the fact that the USCAP had effectively 
broken the 1990s business veto on climate action could be a game-changer. 
Subsequently, Lieberman and Warner set out to write a centrist bill and in 
December, the bill passed the committee. However, in order to attract enough 
votes on the Senate floor to send a signal to the next president that legislators 
were getting serious about passing a climate bill, some key issues still needed to 
be resolved. 
A major concern was the issue of allocation versus auctioning of 
allowances. The USCAP hadn’t yet agreed on specifics, but they would advocate 
initial, free allocation to many of the capped entities. Free allocation would 
smooth the transition and ensure fair treatment of economic sectors, regions and 
income groups disproportionately impacted by GHG regulations. To some 
USCAP members, including one of America’s largest electric utilities, Duke 
                                                 
61 The Call for Action recommends an emissions reduction pathway of i) “between 100-105 
percent of today’s levels within five years of rapid enactment,” ii) “between 90-100 percent of 
today’s levels within ten years of rapid enactment,” and iii) “between 70-90 percent of today’s 
levels within fifteen years of rapid enactment.” Furthermore, “Congress should specify an 
emission target zone aimed at reducing emissions by 60-80 percent from current levels by 2050” 
(pg. 7). 
62 USCAP members included RioTinto, the Exelon Corporation, Alcoa, BP America, Caterpillar, 
Duke Energy, DuPont, FPL Group, General Electric, Lehman Brothers, PG&E, PNM Resources, 
American International Groups (AIG), Alcan, Boston Scientific, Johnson & Johnson, 
ConocoPhillips, Deere & Company, The Dow Chemical Company, General Motors Corp., Marsh, 
PepsiCo, Shell, the Chrysler Group, Xerox, Siemens, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), the 
World Resources Institute (WRI), Pew Centre on Global Climate Change and the Natural 
Resources Defense Council (NRDC), the Nature Conservancy and the National Wildlife 
Federation. 
63 Warner quoted in Pooley 2010, 164. 
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Energy,64 free allocation represented the deal-maker or –breaker. The chairman, 
president and CEO Jim Rogers had over the past years become convinced that in 
the future, regulations were going to be implemented regardless of opposition 
from the coal industry. Based on his good experience with the EPA Acid Rain 
Program—a cap-and-trade scheme for limiting sulphur-dioxide emissions from 
power plants—Rogers was prepared to support a similar system for GHGs. In the 
case of SO2s, the EPA had initially allocated most of the allowances for free to 
utilities,65 enabling them to finance a clean-up using so-called “scrubbers.” While 
critics argued that the system represented a way to secure corporate “windfall 
profits” or “giveaways,” Rogers argued that free allowances were used to abate 
rising costs for consumers.66 In the case of GHGs, the allowance revenues could 
similarly help Rogers modernize Duke Energy’s power plants and finance the 
development and deployment of carbon capture and storage (CCS). Arguably, he 
could not have afforded to do so otherwise. As such, it made sense for Rogers to 
participate in the USCAP and lobby for a GHG cap-and-trade legislation. But he 
alleged that he needed enough free allowances to be able to invest in the 
technology and make the transition to clean electricity affordable for his 
customers.67 
Lieberman and Warner supported both the USCAP and Roger’s position. 
They viewed free distribution of allowances as a means to ensure fairness, ease 
economic burdens and help finance the development and deployment of CCS for 
coal. But the environmental left saw things differently. They argued that people in 
environmentally conscious coastal states already paid more for their electricity, 
and that the free-ride for Midwestern utilities—that relied on dirty coal—had to 
end. To satisfy the left, Lieberman-Warner did not allocate enough free permits to 
satisfy coal-based utilities, so Rogers, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the 
National Association of Manufacturers set out to block their initiative. When the 
bill was called up in June 2008, it was essentially defunct because Boxer had not 
been willing to compromise, and because its foes in business had stirred up so 
much opposition in the Republican Party and the media.68 
The battle over allocation in Lieberman-Warner clearly demonstrated that 
USCAP companies were still divided on the economics of cap-and-trade. Electric 
utilities could not agree on how the allowances should be distributed between 
                                                 
64 Duke supplies and delivers energy to approximately 4 million customers. Due to its vast number 
of coal-fired power plants, the company is the third largest emitter of CO2 in America and the 12th 
largest emitter amongst corporations worldwide. 
65 Each allowanced represented the right to emit one ton of sulfur dioxide in a given year. 
Altogether, 3 percent of allowances in the system were auctioned by the EPA while the remaining 
97 percent were distributed for free based on each company’s historic emissions levels. 
66 Pooley 2010, 149. 
67 Pooley 2010. 
68 Ibid., 201-227. 
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them, while the oil companies were not sure they could embrace a cap if power 
companies got so many free allowances. Furthermore, Rogers had spent over $2.8 
million on lobbyists, and used the media to debunk Lieberman-Warner. On a 
positive note, if the USCAP had dissolved then and there, the coalition would still 
have been remembered for breaking the 1990s business veto on climate action.69 
But the lobby survived after a new round of negotiations. For their 
message to be consistent and effective, the USCAP had to reach an agreement on 
how a climate bill could help finance the clean-up for coal-based electricity 
without being unfair to other sectors. They also had to strike a balance between 
the costs of reduction and stringency of emissions limitations. By the end of 2008 
members had successfully agreed to, and developed a comprehensive manifesto: 
“A Blueprint for Legislative Action: Consensus Recommendations for U.S. 
Climate Protection Legislation.”70 In short, the Blueprint sketched out a detailed 
plan for the development of legislation in the 111th Congress.71 The plan included 
a design for a cap-and-trade system and established a pathway for emissions 
reduction targets of 80-86 percent of 2005 levels by 2020, 58 percent of 2005 
levels by 2030 and 20 percent of 2005 levels by 2050. It recommended that the 
cap cover large stationary sources and fossil-based fuels used by remaining 
sources and the use of abundant offsets72 for cost containment. Allowances should 
initially be distributed for free to capped entities, including a “significant portion 
(e.g. 40 percent)” to utilities. Furthermore, the program should provide credit for 
those taking early action to reduce GHG emissions and a set of complimentary 
measures for technology transformation, including for coal, transportation, 
buildings and energy efficiency. 
By January 2009, 26 companies and the 4 founding environmental 
organizations had signed up for the Blueprint, thereby agreeing to specifics that 
would bind and unify their lobbying efforts. Now, USCAP companies would not 
be able to lobby for something weaker than the Blueprint, while the 
environmental organizations could not demand something stronger. 
The decline of the GCC and the birth of the USCAP demonstrate the 
emergence of a tipping point in business strategies and the creation of a “Baptist 
and bootlegger” coalition for GHG regulation in the United States. Indeed, the 
review of USCAP activities shows how this strategic shift among leading U.S. 
industries resulted in new political action and lobbying for regulatory change. The 
                                                 
69 Ibid., 316. 
70 Available for viewing at the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service website. 
71 The Blueprint also noted that the recommendations do not represent the only path forward, and 
that USCAP therefore stood ready to work with the Administration, Congress and other 
stakeholders to develop a new climate bill. 
72 An offset is a reduction in GHG emissions made to compensate for an emission made 
elsewhere. 
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strengthening and deepening of the USCAP mandate through the Blueprint further 
marks the manifestation of a tipping point. 
 
Catalyzing Change: The Tipping Point Drivers 
 
This section examines the drivers and causes behind the strategic shift in political 
and lobbying tactics amongst USCAP industries. In line with the tipping point 
model, it demonstrates how the emergence of regulatory threats and uncertainties, 
uneven playing fields, and new market opportunities constitute central drivers 
behind the illustrated strategic change. It argues that the tipping-point model thus 
provides a plausible account of why this prominent group of leading U.S. 
industries began to support and lobby for the implementation of mandatory 
federal GHG caps. 
 First, it is evident that the steady acceleration of climate change 
governance in the United States and internationally has contributed to an increase 
in perceptions of regulatory risk among liable industries.73 Perceptions of looming 
regulation have been heightened by several governance trends: the emergence and 
expansion of state-level initiatives, the entering into force of international and 
regional markets for mandatory GHG reduction, the Supreme Court ruling 
establishing EPA’s authority to regulate GHGs under the Clean Air Act and the 
increasing efforts of U.S. senators to sponsor federal GHG legislation. When the 
USCAP was founded, the emerging belief amongst leading industry executives 
that the adoption of federal GHG legislation was ultimately inevitable provided 
one of the major grounds for action. According to Eileen Claussen, President of 
the Pew Center and founder of USCAP, there is not a single USCAP CEO who 
does not consider future GHG regulation inevitable.74 This rationale also provided 
a key motivation for Jeff Immelt, the CEO of General Electric (GE) and co-
founder of the USCAP, to gather fellow-minded corporations and environmental 
organizations to establish a new pro-change lobby for federal cap-and-trade.75 As 
Rogers of Duke Energy argued, “Legislation is coming. We can help shape it or 
we can stand on the sidelines and let others do it.”76 
The perception of high risk or inevitability of GHG regulation has also 
generated significant uncertainty about the future rules of the game. The cost of 
uncertainty can be considerable because regulatory ambiguity can impede 
                                                 
73 Author’s interview with Eileen Claussen, Pew Center on Climate Change, Arlington, March 
2009; Author’s interview with Jennifer Layke, World Resources Institute, Washington D.C., 
March 2009. 
74 Author’s interview with Eileen Claussen, Pew Center on Climate Change, Arlington, March 
2009. 
75 Pooley 2010, 138-139. 
76 Pooley 2010, 170. Statement by Jim Rogers in an e-mail to Robert Murray, CEO of Murray 
Energy. 
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corporations’ abilities to make decisions on future investments. As Claussen 
argued, “If you don’t know what’s coming down the road, you don’t know where 
to make investments or how big they should be. You can’t move forward with this 
regulatory uncertainty.”77 When the USCAP was founded, many corporations felt 
that the level of uncertainty now signaled an end to business as usual.78 An 
increasing share of companies were beginning to realize that if they did not start 
promoting favorable regulation and take a seat at the table, they would end up 
being worse off.79 They could be the victims of a badly designed and costly 
regulatory system, or they could work actively to push for business-friendly and 
cost-efficient legislation. Thus, for many industries the anticipated costs of 
continued legislative inaction were perceived as greater than the anticipated costs 
of compliance with a well-designed cap-and-trade program. For example, to coal-
based utilities such as Duke Energy, badly designed future GHG regulations could 
threaten its very existence. The best way for them to ensure that coal would 
survive in a carbon-constrained market was to work with legislators and push for 
rules that would help them finance, develop and deploy carbon capture and 
storage (CCS).80 
Thus, it is evident that the emergence of regulatory threats and 
uncertainties, an important condition identified by the tipping point model, 
constitutes a major driver behind the strategic shift among USCAP companies.81 
 Second, the emergence of a patchwork of different standards and measures 
for GHG emissions reductions at the state and municipal levels has created an 
uneven playing field for businesses operating in the United States. For these 
companies, lobbying for federal legislation through the USCAP represents a way 
to promote harmonization of the rules. To the USCAP multinationals, the 
adoption of a federal cap-and-trade program would also enable harmonization of 
regulations internationally, by linking them to established emissions-trading 
systems such as the Kyoto mechanisms and the EU ETS. Such linkages would 
reduce the cost of operating in and complying with several different regulatory 
                                                 
77 Author’s interview with Eileen Claussen, Pew Center on Climate Change, Arlington, March 
2009. 
78 Author’s interview with Jennifer Layke, World Resources Institute, Washington D.C., March 
2009. 
79 Author’s interview with Eileen Claussen, Pew Center on Climate Change, Arlington, March 
2009; Author’s interview with Jennifer Layke, World Resources Institute, Washington D.C., 
March 2009; Author’s phone interview with ConocoPhilips, March 2009; Rogers, quoted in 
Pooley 2010, 161. 
80 Pooley 2010, 171. 
81 Author’s interview with Eileen Claussen, Pew Center on Climate Change, Arlington, March 
2009; Layke 2009. 
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systems worldwide.82 Thus, the need for harmonization of uneven regulatory 
playing fields also constitutes an important driver of tipping-points.83 
 Third, a federal cap-and-trade program would also generate considerable 
commercial opportunities for many U.S. industries. Because federal legislation 
can further enhance the commercial viability and competitiveness of clean, low-
carbon energy technologies and options, it is rational for companies with 
considerable investment in such technologies to start pushing for the adoption of 
GHG-limiting legislation. Indeed, some USCAP companies have been early 
movers in the race to develop new, low-carbon solutions. For example, GE is a 
frontrunner in CCS technologies for coal and is also the biggest wind-turbine 
maker in the United States. Each of these turbines includes fourteen products 
made by DuPont. To the major polluters such as coal-fired utilities, it is the free 
allocation of allowances and financial incentives for technological transformation 
that constitutes the main regulation-induced business opportunity. As Rogers of 
Duke Energy argues,84 since allowance revenues would help finance investment 
in carbon-neutral facilities, cap-and-trade represents a business opportunity that 
would chart a future for coal in a carbon-constrained world.85 As such, the range 
of business opportunities for different sectors that would materialize through the 
implementation of federal legislation represents another major tipping-point 
driver. 
Also worth noting, many USCAP companies have already begun to 
implement procedures to cut GHG emissions, for various reasons related to sub-
national compliance, pre-compliance risk management, or green branding. 
Lobbying for a particular design of cap-and-trade therefore represents a way to 
ensure that early action is appropriately awarded. Moreover, after decades of 
debate, most of the USCAP CEOs believe that global warming is real and do not 
want to be blamed by future generations for their neglect.86 
 In sum, it is evident that regulatory risks and uncertainties, unbalance 
playing fields and business opportunities, all key conditions identified by the 
tipping point model, constitute important drivers behind the establishment, 
mandate and lobbying of the USCAP. The next section considers the impact of 
                                                 
82 Author’s interview with Eileen Claussen, Pew Center on Climate Change, Arlington, March 
2009; Author’s interview with Jennifer Layke, World Resources Institute, Washington D.C., 
March 2009; Author’s phone interview with ConocoPhilips, March 2009. 
83 Author’s interview with Eileen Claussen, Pew Center on Climate Change, Arlington, March 
2009; Author’s interview with Jennifer Layke, World Resources Institute, Washington D.C., 
March 2009; Author’s phone interview with ConocoPhilips, March 2009. 
84 Duke has a portfolio of old coal-fired power plants expected to expire in fifty years at the latest.  
85 Pooley 2010, 154. 
86 Author’s interview with Eileen Claussen, Pew Center on Climate Change, Arlington, March 
2009; Author’s interview with Jennifer Layke, World Resources Institute, Washington D.C., 
March 2009; Pooley 2010. 
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this tipping point in business strategies on U.S. climate politics by examining how 
USCAP lobbying influenced the negotiations of federal climate legislation after 
the release of the Blueprint in 2009. 
 
A New Climate for Progress? 
 
In January 2009, Representative Henry Waxman, a Democrat from California, 
took over the powerful House Energy and Commerce Committee, while 
Representative Ed Markey, a Democrat from Massachusetts, took the reigns as 
Chair of the Environment and Economy subcommittee.87 Since the Supreme 
Court ruling on EPA vs. Massachusetts, Waxman had warned about the costs of 
command-and-control regulation and argued that Congress needed to get serious 
about writing a more cost-efficient legislative alternative. He had also observed 
that U.S. businesses appeared to be caught in a worrying investment dilemma. 
Companies are “reluctant to invest in old polluting technologies,” he argued after 
taking over the committee, “because they know that tougher regulations are 
inevitable. But they can’t invest in new, cleaner technologies until they know 
what Congress is going to require.”88 Furthermore, the fact that leading U.S. 
businesses and environmental organizations had joined forces in support of 
legislation had caught his attention. On January 15, his first hearing in the Energy 
and Commerce Committee, Waxman invited the USCAP CEOs to unveil the 
Blueprint. With the cooperation of USCAP, Waxman could write a centrist and 
interest-group supported climate bill. 
Waxman, Markey and USCAP leaders found common ground on 
principles for legislative design. In early March, Rogers (Duke) and Krupp (EDF) 
traveled to the Capitol to comment on the draft bill that was under preparation. 
While the White House had called on Congress to enact cap-and-trade with “a 
100 percent auction to ensure that the biggest polluters do not enjoy windfall 
profits” in the February budget, Waxman supported the USCAP view on 
allocation. In his opinion, they were correct in their view that in order to cushion 
electricity customers in coal-dependent states, allowances should be allocated to 
local distribution companies for free during a transition period. Moreover, free 
allowance distribution was likely to please Midwestern senators concerned about 
regional equity.89 Soon, the President announced that the White House had 
abandoned the plan for full auctioning.90 
                                                 
87 Before this chairmanship, Markey had served as the leader of Pelosi’s committee on global 
warming. 
88 Statement by Senator Waxman at a committee hearing on 15 January 2009 quoted in Pooley 
2010, 332. 
89 Pooley 2010, 336-340. 
90 At a March 24 press conference Obama signaled that his auction plan was dead. 
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On March 31, Waxman released the first draft of his new climate bill. Like 
Lieberman-Warner, it sketched out a federal cap-and-trade system, but it also 
included a number of complementary measures for technology transformation, 
including generous subsidies and incentives for CCS and a provision for 
grandfathering allowances to existing coal-fired plants. The bill left open the issue 
of allowance distribution and the overall stringency of the cap. After several 
rounds of discussion in the committee, senators agreed to mandate free 
transitional allowances for utilities in return for their acceptance of a 17 percent 
emissions reduction target.91 The power sector was allocated 35 percent of all 
allowances covering 90 percent of their total emissions. The oil refineries, which 
were standing on the sidelines, were granted only 2 percent of the allowances. 
Meanwhile, the new EPA administrator Lisa Jackson announced that the 
agency had deemed climate change a danger to public health and welfare, and she 
thus began to prepare rules for GHG emissions reductions, first dealing with 
vehicles and then with stationary sources such as power plants and manufacturing 
facilities. For the business lobby and cost-wary senators, it was a reminder of the 
seriousness of the command-and-control regulatory threat. This reinforced their 
motivation to push a cap-and-trade bill through the House. Yet, outside the 
committee negotiations, opposition to the bill was growing. Critics argued that the 
financial crisis had weakened the case for a market-based approach to GHG 
regulation, and warned that legislators had failed to address weaknesses in 
emissions trading that could lead to the emergence of “subprime carbon” and the 
creation of a “carbon market bubble.”92 Many on the environmental left had 
therefore grown more than skeptical towards Waxman-Markey due to its 
abundant provision of free allowances to the big polluters. On the other hand, 
conservative Republicans started attacking the bill from the right, labeling it “cap-
and-tax” and “freedom-limiting legislation.” 
Nevertheless, in the House, negotiations continued to move forward. In 
May, Waxman announced that the committee had successfully reached a 
compromise and publicly thanked the USCAP members for their help and 
leadership.93 On May 21, the Waxman-Markey bill passed the Energy and 
                                                 
91 The bargain was made between Representatives Waxman, Markey and the previous chair Rich 
Boucher (Virginia) and the power sector represented by the USCAP and the Edison Electric 
Institute (EEI).  
92 Chan 2009. The Director of the Green Investment Program and Friends of the Earth, Michelle 
Chan, also testified before the U.S. House Ways and Means Committee in March 2009, arguing 
that without adequate market oversight, financial intermediaries would enter the market and allow 
speculators to push up prices and create a carbon bubble.  
93 To a crowd of legislators, lobbyists, policy specialists and environmental leaders at the Capitol, 
Waxman stated that “we used that proposal as a model for our legislation. I believe that the only 
hope we have to get legislation passed is to show a consensus of American business and 
environmentalists.” (Waxman, quoted in Pooley 2010, 375). 
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Commerce committee by a vote of 33 to 25, and on June 26 it passed in the House 
of Representatives by a 219-212 vote. It was a tight margin that had required a lot 
of political bargaining as well as the engagement of President Obama, who had 
personally asked uncommitted members from both parties for their votes. It was a 
historic moment, nonetheless, because for the very first time, legislators, 
corporate lobbyists, environmentalists and labor unions had worked together to 
arrive at a grand bargain that would impose mandatory reductions of GHG 
emissions in the United States. 
For legislation to become law, however, a bill must be passed by both 
chambers of Congress, the House and the Senate, and then signed by the 
President. Because of Senate rules which give the minority power to stall votes, 
controversial bills often require 60 votes just to be heard on the floor. With no 
shortage of Republicans and even a few Democrats intent on filibustering, any 
climate bill would require a 60-vote supermajority in the Senate. After one failed 
attempt by Boxer and Kerry to forge a more left-oriented edition of Waxman-
Markey through the Senate, Kerry teamed up with Lieberman and Republican 
Lindsay Graham (South Carolina) to write a revised, centrist version. 
Initially, the Kerry-Lieberman-Graham (KGL) initiative met some 
renewed resistance from industry groups, primarily due to emerging conflicts of 
interests over allowance allocations. Amongst coal-based utilities, some members 
of the American Coalition for Clean Coal Electricity (ACCCE)—from which the 
USCAP utilities had resigned—now said they did not want to support a climate 
bill in 2010. Opposition had also grown from the oil refineries, who were 
dissatisfied with the low proportion of allowances they had been attributed 
relative to utilities. The American Petroleum Institute (API) began disseminating 
reports, which argued that the costs of  KGL would harm the U.S. economy.94 
Furthermore, the API encouraged all its members to send their employees to 
partake in a so-called “Energy Citizen” rally against GHG legislation. In February 
2010, BP and ConocoPhillips pulled out of the USCAP because they thought the 
coalition favored coal at their expense.95 
However, when negotiations for  KGL got serious in the autumn of 2009, 
the business opposition was successfully appeased. From October 2009 to April 
2010, Kerry and Lieberman met regularly with business lobbies such as the 
USCAP, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the API, the EEI, the National 
Association of Manufacturers and others to reach consensus and make sure 
everyone was satisfied with the bill’s provisions. During this process, the senators 
                                                 
94 For example, a study cooked up by the Heritage Foundation, a think tank partly funded by 
ExxonMobil, argued that the cost of gasoline would increase by $4 a gallon and lead to huge job 
losses. 
95 The Hill, “USCAP Departures Fray Industry Green Climate Unity,” 6 February 2010; The 
Washington Post, “ConocoPhillips, BP and Caterpillar Quit USCAP,” 2 February 2010. 
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reached a non-aggression pact with the API and the Chamber, whereby industry 
promised to refrain from publicly attacking their proposal in exchange for a 
number of concessions designed to keep compliance costs low.96 The first draft 
established a cap-and-trade system for the electric power sector only, a carbon 
“fee” linked to the price of allowances for oil companies and a cap for 
steelmakers and other energy-intensive industries that would be phased in slowly. 
USCAP and other business lobbies immediately threw their weight behind it. 
Some groups, such as the EEI, even issued public statements in support of the 
bill.97 
Industry efforts to pass  KGL were significant. In April, Rio Tinto sent a 
letter to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV)—since the majority leader is 
responsible for setting the Senate agenda—which pleaded for climate legislation 
in 2010. In the letter, CEO Preston Chiaro argued that neglect “will not only delay 
the action necessary to address the climate imperative, but will increase, rather 
than reduce, the uncertainties for businesses like Rio Tinto as we face a more 
rigid and expensive regulatory process under the Clean Air Act.”98 In May, 60 
leading U.S. corporations also sent a letter to President Obama, Senator Reid and 
the Republican Minority Leader Senator Mitch McConnell,99 which strongly 
urged them to “move forward this year on comprehensive energy and climate 
legislation.” The letter emphasized the opportunities related to climate action and 
argued that “we face a critical moment that will determine whether we will be 
able to unleash homegrown American innovation or remain stuck in the status 
quo... Americans need and deserve a comprehensive energy and climate policy 
and we urge you to take action without delay.”100 
Thus, KGL had the support of a coalition of major environmental groups 
and leading U.S. industries, including a large share of the nation’s biggest 
polluters. No previous attempts to pass climate legislation had ever come this 
far.101 Yet, in the summer of 2010, senators pulled the plug on the  KGL bill. On 
July 8, Graham announced that he would no longer support the bill he had helped 
to author, and with the loss of this pivotal bipartisan bridge, climate change 
                                                 
96 Politico, “Talks Might Not Save Climate Bill,” 22 July 2010; The New Yorker, “As the World 
Burns,” 11 October 2010. 
97 Pooley 2010; The New Yorker, “As the World Burns,” 11 October 2010. 
98 Letter from CEO Preston Chiaro of Rio Tinto to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid. 28 April  
2010. 
99 Together these companies represent over 1 million employees and revenues over $1.2 trillion. 
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Honeywell, NRG Energy, PG&E, Shell, Siemens, Dow and others. 
100 Letter to the President, Senator Reid and Mitch McConnell from sixty corporations, 27 May 
2010. See TreeHugger, 28 May 2010. “Big Corporations Lobby President, Congress for Climate 
Legislation.” 
101 The New Yorker, “As the World Burns,” 11 October 2010.  
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legislation was pretty much dead.102 By the end of the month it was clear that 
there simply were not enough votes. What led the process to collapse? 
KGL’s cooperation with industry and their attempt to forge a grand 
bargain by handing out concessions to big polluters did not sit well with the 
environmental left. After its release, over 200 grass-root groups and some 
prominent green organizations including Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth 
immediately came out in opposition to the bill.103 These groups strongly contested 
the design of  KGL, which they considered to be a major corporate bailout, for 
providing abundant windfall profits to the oil, coal, nuclear and agribusiness 
industries.104 Until senators could agree on a stronger bill that did not shower 
billions of dollars on polluters, many on the environmental left preferred the 
implementation of EPA regulations over the democratic legislative approach.105 
More importantly, despite its market-based and business friendly 
approach,  KGL failed to harvest enough support from Republicans and Blue-Dog 
Democrats.106 Democrats had hoped that with the support of their industry 
backers they would be able to collect enough Republican votes.107 But this proved 
much more difficult than expected. While Senator Graham was showered with 
new financial support from pro-regulation utilities in return for his work on the 
climate bill,108 he was the only Republican willing to work with Democrats on 
this particular legislation. There were other Republican climate advocates 
including Florida Senator LeMieux and Maine Senators Olympia Snowe and 
Susan Collins, but they never came out in support of  KGL. Furthermore, John 
McCain, a long-standing climate advocate and co-writer of the Lieberman-
McCain cap-and-trade bill of 2009, also ended up withdrawing his support for 
climate legislation during a hostile election challenge in the Arizona primary. He 
was attacked as a moderate and was forced to defend his position on global 
                                                 
102 Politico, “Energy Bill Stuck In Neutral,” 9 July 2010; The Economist, “Lindsay Graham Kills 
His Bill,” 9 June 2010. 
103 Grist, “Big Green and little green clash over the American Power Act,” 18 May 2010. 
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108 The New Yorker, “As the World Burns,” 11 October 2010. Grahams PAC contribution from 
utilities grew from nothing in 2009 to $49,000 in 2010, and Fred Krupp from the EDF and 
USCAP furthermore introduced Graham to businesses new donors who were willing to contribute 
to his campaign in exchange for promoting climate legislation. 
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warming to conservative voters, who were increasingly skeptical that cap-and-
trade was just another energy tax.109 
Already during the run-up vote on Waxman-Markey in 2009, Republican 
campaigns and their coverage by media-outlets targeted climate legislation. This 
may have undermined support for Democrats leading up to the midterm elections. 
Cap-and-trade was re-branded as cap-and-tax, a strategic attempt to frame the 
legislation as a hidden national energy tax and paint Democrats as out-of-control 
regulators.110 The tax phraseology was also an important contributor to Graham’s 
withdrawal and thus, the death of the bill. Initially, the  KGL included a linked fee 
for oil refineries, but this was re-negotiated due to the possibility that it would be 
conceived of as a tax and because the refineries agreed to shelve the fee and 
accept a system for fixed-price permits. But the White House, afraid of being 
accused for supporting a tax-hike, went on to sabotage the bill and the 
commitment of its bipartisan bridge, Graham. Based on a leak from within the 
Administration, on April 15 Fox News reported that “White House Opposes 
Higher Gas Taxes Floated by S.C.GOP Sen. Graham in Emerging Senate Energy 
Bill,” in effect labeling the now non-existent linked-fee as a ‘gas tax’ and blaming 
Graham for it. Since the Administration leaker deliberately went to Fox in South 
Carolina, it may seem as if the leak was intended to spur criticism of Graham 
amongst Republicans and Tea Party supporters in his own constituency. 
Democrats made their implicit decision to kill the bill even more apparent when 
Majority Leader Reid announced in the end of April that he wanted to pass 
immigration reform before a climate bill. It was the last straw for Graham, who 
had gone out on a limb to cooperate with Democrats and felt he had been stabbed 
in the back. He would ultimately abandon the  KGL initiative.111 
With the exception of the days spent whipping the vote for Waxman-
Markey in June 2009, President Obama never engaged actively with Congress or 
the Senate to draft legislation and/or push for a cap. On the contrary, the gas-tax 
leak and the sabotage of Graham indicated that the White House sought to kill the  
KGL bill due to the risk that it would spur a political back-lash against 
Democrats. As long as the polling numbers and/or the 60 senate votes were not 
clearly there, Obama’s advisors Rahm Emanuel and David Axelrod believed it 
was better for the president to pursue a hands-off approach. Emanuel was most 
concerned with acquiring and maintaining presidential power and was not willing 
to squander the president’s political capital on a potentially lost cause.112 “We 
want to do this climate bill,” Emanuel argued to a group of CEOs in a USCAP-
White House meeting. “But we need to put points on the board. We only want to 
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do things that are going to be successful. If the climate bill bogs down, we move 
on. We’ve got health care.”113 Thus, despite President Obama’s campaign 
promises to prioritize energy and climate change, it seemed to have slipped 
further and further down the agenda. He stood silent while opponents hijacked the 
public debate and did little to prevent the negative effects of the cap-and-tax 
phraseology. Indeed, it could be argued that his administration hastened that 
trend. Carol Browner, the Obama-appointed director of the White House Office of 
Energy and Climate Change Policy, had only three aides working directly for her. 
While the office attended the meetings of  KGL staffers, they never expressed a 
policy preference or attempted to take the lead in the process. And despite 
continuous pressure from industry, environmental groups and leading U.S. 
senators to provide hands-on leadership, the Obama Administration did nothing to 
help collect the 60 votes needed for  KGL.114 
Clearly, this time around it was not industry that hobbled efforts to forge a 
centrist “grand bargain” for federal climate legislation, but the lack of presidential 
leadership and commitment, Republican framing and the tough political 
environment surrounding the midterm elections. According to Senator Kerry, it 
was the cooperation with industry that helped them come as far, and it is industry 
cooperation that will help pass climate legislation in the future: “The bottom line 
is that for more than a decade, climate change legislation was dead in the cradle 
because senators pointed to opposition from their home-state industries and 
businesses, and millions upon millions of dollars in negative advertising ground 
every debate to a halt.”115 The review of the negotiations behind Waxman-Markey 
and  KGL illustrate that after the emergence of a tipping point in business 
strategies, this dynamic changed dramatically. Indeed, the USCAP and its allies 
helped pass climate legislation in the House and played a key role in the attempt 
to forge  KGL through the Senate. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has presented a model for analyzing change in business strategies 
related to climate change regulation. It is demonstrated that under certain 
conditions that may emerge as a particular issue area of environmental 
governance matures, including the emergence of regulatory threats and 
uncertainties, uneven playing fields and new market opportunities, the strategies 
of many prominent and leading industries are likely to shift from opposition to 
regulatory support and entrepreneurship. The model identifies the culmination of 
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this gradual process of change as a “tipping point,” at which a significant share of 
leading corporations and business lobbies begin to support and push for 
regulatory change. It is also argued that a tipping point in business strategies is 
likely to generate new political momentum and enabling conditions for political 
bargaining, which may spur significant progress in the regulatory negotiation 
process. 
 The article has used the tipping-point model to analyze the evolution of 
climate change politics in the United States. The case study finds that the model 
provides a plausible account of, first, the lack of federal climate action in the 
1990s and early 2000s, and second, the new momentum to impose federal GHG 
legislation between 2008 and 2010. While business lobbying provided a major 
obstacle to regulatory change for over 15 years, this dynamic clearly changed 
after the emergence of a tipping point in business strategies. The tipping point is 
identified here as the establishment of the pro-change lobbying coalition USCAP 
and their efforts to push for the adoption of a federal cap-and-trade program. The 
case also demonstrated how the tipping point generated new political momentum 
and progress in efforts to negotiate federal climate legislation. USCAP and their 
allies played a key, enabling role first in the negotiations behind the Waxman-
Markey climate bill, which passed the House in 2009, and second in the 
bargaining process behind the  KGL bill and the attempt to forge it through the 
Senate in 2010. It is argued that the  KGL negotiations collapsed not due to, but in 
spite of, continuous industry support and lobbying. Rather, it was the lack of 
presidential leadership and commitment, Republican framing and the tough 
bipartisan political environment leading up to the midterm elections that caused 
the process to collapse. 
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